Wild Credit contest
Findings & Analysis Report



About C4

Code 432n4 (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers, and individuals with domain expertise in smart contracts.

A C4 code contest is an event in which community participants, referred to as Wardens, review, audit, or analyze smart contract logic in exchange for a bounty provided by sponsoring projects.

During the code contest outlined in this document, C4 conducted an analysis of Wild Credit contest smart contract system written in Solidity. The code contest took place between September 23—September 29 2021.


15 Wardens contributed reports to the Wild Credit contest code contest:

This contest was judged by ghoul.sol.

Final report assembled by itsmetechjay and CloudEllie.


The C4 analysis yielded an aggregated total of 14 unique vulnerabilities and 63 total findings. All of the issues presented here are linked back to their original finding

Of these vulnerabilities, 2 received a risk rating in the category of HIGH severity, 3 received a risk rating in the category of MEDIUM severity, and 9 received a risk rating in the category of LOW severity.

C4 analysis also identified 27 non-critical recommendations and 22 gas optimizations.


The code under review can be found within the C4 Wild Credit contest repository, and is composed of 40 smart contracts written in the Solidity programming language and includes 2,425 lines of Solidity code and 0 lines of JavaScript.

Severity Criteria

C4 assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to a methodology based on OWASP standards.

Vulnerabilities are divided into three primary risk categories: high, medium, and low.

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

  • Malicious Input Handling
  • Escalation of privileges
  • Arithmetic
  • Gas use

Further information regarding the severity criteria referenced throughout the submission review process, please refer to the documentation provided on the C4 website.

High Risk Findings (3)

[H-01] Use of tokenB’s price instead of tokenA in determining account health will lead to protocol mis-accounting and insolvency

Submitted by 0xRajeev, also found by WatchPug.


In _supplyCreditUni(), the last argument of _convertTokenValues() on L674 being _priceB instead of _priceA in the calculation of supplyB is a typo (should be _priceA) and therefore miscalculates supplyB, creditB, creditUni and therefore totalAccountSupply in function accountHealth() which affects the health of account/protocol determination that is used across all borrows/withdrawals/transfers/liquidations in the protocol. This miscalculation significantly affects all calculations in protocol and could therefore cause protocol insolvency.

Proof of Concept

Tools Used

Manual Analysis

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Change the last argument of \_convertTokenValues() from \_priceB to \_priceA on L674.

talegift (Wild Credit) confirmed

[H-02] Liquidation can be escaped by depositing a Uni v3 position with 0 liquidity

Submitted by WatchPug.

When the liquidator is trying to liquidate a undercolldarezed loan by calling liquidateAccount(), it calls _unwrapUniPosition() -> uniV3Helper.removeLiquidity() -> positionManager.decreaseLiquidity().

However, when the Uni v3 position has 0 liquidity, positionManager.decreaseLiquidity() will fail.

See: https://github.com/Uniswap/v3-periphery/blob/main/contracts/NonfungiblePositionManager.sol#L265

Based on this, a malicious user can escaped liquidation by depositing a Uni v3 position with 0 liquidity.


Undercollateralized debts cannot be liquidated and it leads to bad debts to the protocol.

A malicious user can take advantage of this by creating long positions on the collateral assets and take profit on the way up, and keep taking more debt out of the protocol, while when the price goes down, the debt can not be liquidated and the risks of bad debt are paid by the protocol.

Proof of Concept
  1. A malicious user deposits some collateral assets and borrow the max amount of debt;
  2. The user deposits a Uni v3 position with 0 liquidity;
  3. When the market value of the collateral assets decreases, the liquadation will fail as positionManager.decreaseLiquidity() reverts.

Check if liquidity > 0 when removeLiquidity.

talegift (Wild Credit) confirmed:

Valid issue. Good catch.

Severity should be lowered to 2 as it doesn’t allow direct theft of funds and the loss would only occur under specific external conditions.

2 — Med: Assets not at direct risk, but the function of the protocol or its availability could be impacted, or leak value with a hypothetical attack path with stated assumptions, but external requirements


ghoul-sol (judge) commented:

To my understanding, bad position would affect the whole protocol and a loss would have to be paid by other participans which means funds can be drained. For that reason, I’m keeping high risk.

Medium Risk Findings (4)

[M-01] Use of deprecated Chainlink API

Submitted by 0xRajeev, also found by cmichel and leastwood.


The contract uses Chainlink’s deprecated API latestAnswer(). Such functions might suddenly stop working if Chainlink stopped supporting deprecated APIs.

Impact: Deprecated API stops working. Prices cannot be obtained. Protocol stops and contracts have to be redeployed.

See similar Low-severity finding L11 from OpenZeppelin’s Audit of Opyn Gamma Protocol: https://blog.openzeppelin.com/opyn-gamma-protocol-audit/

This was a Medium-severity finding even in the previous version of WildCredit contest as well: https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-07-wildcredit-findings/issues/75 where it was reported that ”latestAnswer method will return the last value, but you won’t be able to check if the data is fresh. On the other hand, calling the method latestRoundData allows you to run some extra validations.”

Proof of Concept


See https://docs.chain.link/docs/deprecated-aggregatorinterface-api-reference/#latestanswer.

Tools Used

Manual Analysis

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Use V3 interface functions: https://docs.chain.link/docs/price-feeds-api-reference/

talegift (Wild Credit) acknowledged::

We’ll remove dependence on Chainlink completely.

[M-02] LendingPair.withdrawUniPosition should accrue debt first

Submitted by cmichel.

The LendingPair.withdrawUniPosition function allows the user to withdraw their UniswapV3 pool position (NFT) again. As the Uniswap position acts as collateral in the protocol, a health check is performed afterwards.

However, it does not check the current debt of the caller as it does not accrue the debt for both tokens first.


In the worst case, in low-activity markets, it could happen that debt has not accrued for a long time and the current debt is significantly higher than the current recorded debt in totalDebtAmount. An account with a de-facto negative health ratio if the debt was accrued could still withdraw their collateral NFT instead of having to repay their debt first.


Accrue the debt for both tokens first in LendingPair.withdrawUniPosition.

talegift (Wild Credit) confirmed

[M-03] Supply part of the accrued debt can be stolen

Submitted by cmichel.

The LendingPair.uniClaimDeposit function allows the user to “collect fees” and mint new supply shares with the collected amounts.

uniClaimDeposit does not accrue tokens

However, the current total supply is not accrued in the function. This means an attacker can:

  • mint shares using uniClaimDeposit
  • increase the totalSupplyAmount by calling accrue(token0) and accrue(token1) afterwards.
  • call withdraw and receive a larger amount of tokens for the newly minted shares due to the increase in totalSupplyAmount from accrue (increasing the supply share price _sharesToSupply).

This would only lead to a small protocol loss if uniClaimDeposit would only collect the fees, however, combined with another flaw, one can steal almost the entire protocol lpRate each time:

uniClaimDeposit allows collecting entire liquidity instead of just fees

This has to do with the way liquidity from a Uniswap V3 position (NFT) is withdrawn:

An attacker can perform the following attack:

  • Create a Uniswap V3 position.
  • Get flashloans for both tokens to provide lots of liquidity for this position.
  • Call positionManager.decreaseLiquidity such that the entire liquidity is removed and stored (but not collected yet) in the position’s tokensOwed0/1 fields
  • Deposit it to WildCredit’s lending pair using depositUniPosition
  • Call uniClaimDeposit to mint a huge amount of NFT supply shares. This huge amount will capture the protocol’s debt accrual in the next steps.
  • Call accrue on both tokens to accrue debt and pay the lpRate part of it to suppliers, increasing totalSupplyAmount and thus the value of a supply share.
  • With the new debt added to the totalSupplyAmount, the attacker can now withdraw their minted shares again and capture most of the new debt that was accrued, making a profit.


Combining these two issues, an attacker could steal most of the accrued lpRate in a single atomic transaction. The attacker can repeat this step capturing the supplier interest for each accrual. (The longer the market hasn’t been accrued, the bigger the profit per single attack transaction, but in the end, the attacker could perform this attack at every block or when it becomes profitable for the gas costs.)

Providing / removing Uniswap V3 liquidity does not incur fees.

The attacker’s profit is the loss of other legitimate suppliers that capture less of the newly accrued debt.


Accrue the debt for both tokens first in LendingPair.uniClaimDeposit.

It might also be a good idea to disallow collecting the “parked” liquidity in a token (that has been removed but not yet collected) by immediately collecting them when the NFT is deposited in depositUniPosition. I.e., call _uniCollectFees in depositUniPosition to withdraw any outstanding tokens and fees. Then mint shares with these token amounts.

talegift (Wild Credit) confirmed:

We’ll implement the suggested fix.

Suggest lowering severity to 2 as it doesn’t allow direct theft of funds and the loss would only occur under specific external conditions - long periods of not accrue interest combined with a low gas price to steal the pending interest.

ghoul-sol (judge) commented:

It seems that the attacker can steal interest that is owed to other users but deposits are safe. For that reason I agree with sponsor to make this medium risk.

Low Risk Findings (10)

Non-Critical Findings (28)

Gas Optimizations (22)


C4 is an open organization governed by participants in the community.

C4 Contests incentivize the discovery of exploits, vulnerabilities, and bugs in smart contracts. Security researchers are rewarded at an increasing rate for finding higher-risk issues. Contest submissions are judged by a knowledgeable security researcher and solidity developer and disclosed to sponsoring developers. C4 does not conduct formal verification regarding the provided code but instead provides final verification.

C4 does not provide any guarantee or warranty regarding the security of this project. All smart contract software should be used at the sole risk and responsibility of users.