# Overview

Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers, and individuals with domain expertise in smart contracts.

A C4 code contest is an event in which community participants, referred to as Wardens, review, audit, or analyze smart contract logic in exchange for a bounty provided by sponsoring projects.

During the code contest outlined in this document, C4 conducted an analysis of Streaming Protocol contest smart contract system written in Solidity. The code contest took place between November 30—December 7 2021.

## Wardens

38 Wardens contributed reports to the Streaming Protocol contest:

1. hack3r-0m
2. bitbopper
3. WatchPug (jtp and ming)
4. gpersoon
5. hyh
6. cyberboy
7. Meta0xNull
8. kenzo
9. 0x0x0x
10. Jujic
11. pedroais
12. cmichel
13. defsec
14. gzeon
15. pauliax
16. GiveMeTestEther
17. GeekyLumberjack
18. ScopeLift (wildmolasses, bendi, and mds1)
19. harleythedog
20. 0x1f8b
21. Ruhum
22. hubble (ksk2345 and shri4net)
23. wuwe1
24. itsmeSTYJ
25. jonah1005
26. toastedsteaksandwich
27. Omik
28. jayjonah8
29. egjlmn1
30. robee
31. csanuragjain
32. mtz
33. ye0lde
34. pmerkleplant
35. danb
36. pants

This contest was judged by 0xean.

Final report assembled by itsmetechjay and CloudEllie.

# Summary

The C4 analysis yielded an aggregated total of 42 unique vulnerabilities and 118 total findings. All of the issues presented here are linked back to their original finding.

Of these vulnerabilities, 10 received a risk rating in the category of HIGH severity, 5 received a risk rating in the category of MEDIUM severity, and 27 received a risk rating in the category of LOW severity.

C4 analysis also identified 23 non-critical recommendations and 53 gas optimizations.

# Scope

The code under review can be found within the C4 Streaming Protocol contest repository, and is composed of 3 smart contracts written in the Solidity programming language and includes ~880 source lines of Solidity code.

# Severity Criteria

C4 assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to a methodology based on OWASP standards.

Vulnerabilities are divided into three primary risk categories: high, medium, and low.

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

• Malicious Input Handling
• Escalation of privileges
• Arithmetic
• Gas use

Further information regarding the severity criteria referenced throughout the submission review process, please refer to the documentation provided on the C4 website.

# High Risk Findings (10)

## [H-01] Wrong calculation of excess depositToken allows stream creator to retrieve depositTokenFlashloanFeeAmount, which may cause fund loss to users

Submitted by WatchPug, also found by 0x0x0x, ScopeLift, gpersoon, harleythedog, hyh, gzeon, jonah1005, and kenzo

https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L654-L654

uint256 excess = ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - (depositTokenAmount - redeemedDepositTokens);

In the current implementation, depositTokenFlashloanFeeAmount is not excluded when calculating excess depositToken. Therefore, the stream creator can call recoverTokens(depositToken, recipient) and retrieve depositTokenFlashloanFeeAmount if there are any.

As a result:

• When the protocol governance calls claimFees() and claim accumulated depositTokenFlashloanFeeAmount, it may fail due to insufficient balance of depositToken.
• Or, part of users’ funds (depositToken) will be transferred to the protocol governance as fees, causing some users unable to withdraw or can only withdraw part of their deposits.

#### Proof of Concept

Given:

• feeEnabled: true
• feePercent: 10 (0.1%)
• Alice deposited 1,000,000 depositToken;
• Bob called flashloan() and borrowed 1,000,000 depositToken, then repaid 1,001,000;
• Charlie deposited 1,000 depositToken;
• After endDepositLock, Alice called claimDepositTokens() and withdrawn 1,000,000 depositToken;
• streamCreator called recoverTokens(depositToken, recipient) and retrieved 1,000 depositToken (2,000 - (1,001,000 - 1,000,000));
• governance called claimFees() and retrieved another 1,000 depositToken;
• Charlie tries to claimDepositTokens() but since the current balanceOf depositToken is 0, the transcation always fails, and Charlie loses all the depositToken.

#### Recommendation

Change to:

uint256 excess = ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - (depositTokenAmount - redeemedDepositTokens) - depositTokenFlashloanFeeAmount;

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) confirmed

## [H-02] Tokens can be stolen when depositToken == rewardToken

Submitted by cmichel, also found by 0x0x0x, gzeon, Ruhum, gpersoon, hack3r-0m, and pauliax

The Streaming contract allows the deposit and reward tokens to be the same token.

I believe this is intended, think Sushi reward on Sushi as is the case with xSushi.

The reward and deposit balances are also correctly tracked independently in depositTokenAmount and rewardTokenAmount. However, when recovering tokens this leads to issues as the token is recovered twice, once for deposits and another time for rewards:

function recoverTokens(address token, address recipient) public lock {
// NOTE: it is the stream creators responsibility to save
// tokens on behalf of their users.
require(msg.sender == streamCreator, "!creator");
if (token == depositToken) {
require(block.timestamp > endDepositLock, "time");
// get the balance of this contract
// check what isnt claimable by either party
// @audit-info depositTokenAmount updated on stake/withdraw/exit, redeemedDepositTokens increased on claimDepositTokens
uint256 excess = ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - (depositTokenAmount - redeemedDepositTokens);
// allow saving of the token
ERC20(token).safeTransfer(recipient, excess);

emit RecoveredTokens(token, recipient, excess);
return;
}

if (token == rewardToken) {
require(block.timestamp > endRewardLock, "time");
// check current balance vs internal balance
//
// NOTE: if a token rebases, i.e. changes balance out from under us,
// most of this contract breaks and rugs depositors. this isn't exclusive
// to this function but this function would in theory allow someone to rug
// and recover the excess (if it is worth anything)

// check what isnt claimable by depositors and governance
// @audit-info rewardTokenAmount increased on fundStream
uint256 excess = ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - (rewardTokenAmount + rewardTokenFeeAmount);
ERC20(token).safeTransfer(recipient, excess);

emit RecoveredTokens(token, recipient, excess);
return;
}
// ...

#### Proof Of Concept

Given recoverTokens == depositToken, Stream creator calls recoverTokens(token = depositToken, creator).

• The token balance is the sum of deposited tokens (minus reclaimed) plus the reward token amount. ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) >= (depositTokenAmount - redeemedDepositTokens) + (rewardTokenAmount + rewardTokenFeeAmount)
• if (token == depositToken) executes, the excess from the deposit amount will be the reward amount (excess >= rewardTokenAmount + rewardTokenFeeAmount). This will be transferred.
• if (token == rewardToken) executes, the new token balance is just the deposit token amount now (because the reward token amount has been transferred out in the step before). Therefore, ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) >= depositTokenAmount - redeemedDepositTokens. If this is non-negative, the transaction does not revert and the creator makes a profit.

Example:

• outstanding redeemable deposit token amount: depositTokenAmount - redeemedDepositTokens = 1000
• funded rewardTokenAmount (plus rewardTokenFeeAmount fees): rewardTokenAmount + rewardTokenFeeAmount = 500

Creator receives 1500 - 1000 = 500 excess deposit and 1000 - 500 = 500 excess reward.

#### Impact

When using the same deposit and reward token, the stream creator can steal tokens from the users who will be unable to withdraw their profit or claim their rewards.

One needs to be careful with using .balanceOf in this special case as it includes both deposit and reward balances.

Add a special case for recoverTokens when token == depositToken == rewardToken and then the excess should be ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - (depositTokenAmount - redeemedDepositTokens) - (rewardTokenAmount + rewardTokenFeeAmount);

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) confirmed

## [H-03] Reward token not correctly recovered

Submitted by cmichel, also found by GeekyLumberjack, kenzo, pedroais, and hyh

The Streaming contract allows recovering the reward token by calling recoverTokens(rewardToken, recipient).

However, the excess amount is computed incorrectly as ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - (rewardTokenAmount + rewardTokenFeeAmount):

function recoverTokens(address token, address recipient) public lock {
if (token == rewardToken) {
require(block.timestamp > endRewardLock, "time");

// check what isnt claimable by depositors and governance
// @audit-issue rewardTokenAmount increased on fundStream, but never decreased! this excess underflows
uint256 excess = ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - (rewardTokenAmount + rewardTokenFeeAmount);
ERC20(token).safeTransfer(recipient, excess);

emit RecoveredTokens(token, recipient, excess);
return;
}
// ...

Note that rewardTokenAmount only ever increases (when calling fundStream) but it never decreases when claiming the rewards through claimReward. However, claimReward transfers out the reward token.

Therefore, the rewardTokenAmount never tracks the contract’s reward balance and the excess cannot be computed that way.

#### Proof Of Concept

Assume no reward fees for simplicity and only a single user staking.

• Someone funds 1000 reward tokens through fundStream(1000). Then rewardTokenAmount = 1000
• The stream and reward lock period is over, i.e. block.timestamp > endRewardLock
• The user claims their full reward and receives 1000 reward tokens by calling claimReward(). The reward contract balance is now 0 but rewardTokenAmount = 1000
• Some fool sends 1000 reward tokens to the contract by accident. These cannot be recovered as the excess = balance - rewardTokenAmount = 0

#### Impact

Reward token recovery does not work.

The claimed rewards need to be tracked as well, just like the claimed deposits are tracked. I think you can even decrease rewardTokenAmount in claimReward because at this point rewardTokenAmount is not used to update the cumulativeRewardPerToken anymore.

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) confirmed

## [H-04] Improper implementation of arbitraryCall() allows protocol gov to steal funds from users’ wallets

Submitted by WatchPug, also found by Jujic and hack3r-0m

https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L733-L735

function arbitraryCall(address who, bytes memory data) public lock externallyGoverned {
// cannot have an active incentive for the callee
require(incentives[who] == 0, "inc");
...

When an incentiveToken is claimed after endStream, incentives[who] will be 0 for that incentiveToken.

If the protocol gov is malicious or compromised, they can call arbitraryCall() with the address of the incentiveToken as who and transferFrom() as calldata and steal all the incentiveToken in the victim’s wallet balance up to the allowance amount.

#### Proof of Concept

1. Alice approved USDC to the streaming contract;
2. Alice called createIncentive() and added 1,000 USDC of incentive;
3. After the stream is done, the stream creator called claimIncentive() and claimed 1,000 USDC;

The compromised protocol gov can call arbitraryCall() and steal all the USDC in Alice’s wallet balance.

#### Recommendation

Consider adding a mapping: isIncentiveToken, setting isIncentiveToken[incentiveToken] = true in createIncentive(), and require(!isIncentiveToken[who], ...) in arbitraryCall().

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) confirmed

## [H-05] Possible incentive theft through the arbitraryCall() function

Submitted by toastedsteaksandwich, also found by Omik, ScopeLift, bitbopper, pedroais, gzeon, Meta0xNull, and wuwe1

#### Impact

The Locke.arbitraryCall() function allows the inherited governance contract to perform arbitrary contract calls within certain constraints. Contract calls to tokens provided as incentives through the createIncentive() function are not allowed if there is some still some balance according to the incentives mapping (See line 735 referenced below).

However, the token can still be called prior any user creating an incentive, so it’s possible for the arbitraryCall() function to be used to set an allowance on an incentive token before the contract has actually received any of the token through createIncentive().

In summary:

1. If some possible incentive tokens are known prior to being provided, the arbitraryCall() function can be used to pre-approve a token allowance for a malicious recipient.
2. Once a user calls createIncentive() and provides one of the pre-approved tokens, the malicious recipient can call transferFrom on the provided incentive token and withdraw the tokens.

#### Proof of Concept

https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/main/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L735

##### Recommendation 1

Limit the types of incentive tokens so it can be checked that it’s not the target contract for the arbitraryCall().

##### Recommendation 2

Validate that the allowance of the target contract (if available) has not changed.

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) confirmed

## [H-06] Creating rewardTokens without streaming depositTokens

Submitted by bitbopper

#### Impact

stake and withdraws can generate rewardTokens without streaming depositTokens. It does not matter whether the stream is a sale or not.

The following lines can increase the reward balance on a withdraw some time after stake: https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/main/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L219:L222

// accumulate reward per token info
cumulativeRewardPerToken = rewardPerToken();

// update user rewards
ts.rewards = earned(ts, cumulativeRewardPerToken);

While the following line can be gamed in order to not stream any tokens (same withdraw tx).

Specifically an attacker can arrange to create a fraction less than zero thereby substracting zero.

https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L229

ts.tokens -= uint112(acctTimeDelta * ts.tokens / (endStream - ts.lastUpdate));
// WARDEN TRANSLATION: (elapsedSecondsSinceStake * stakeAmount) / (endStreamTimestamp - stakeTimestamp)

A succesful attack increases the share of rewardTokens of the attacker.

The attack can be repeated every block increasing the share further. The attack could be done from multiple EOA increasing the share further. In short: Attackers can create loss of funds for (honest) stakers.

The economic feasability of the attack depends on:

• staked amount (times number of attacks) vs total staked amount
• relative value of rewardToken to gasprice

#### Proof of Concept

##### code

The following was added to Locke.t.sol for the StreamTest Contract to simulate the attack from one EOA.

function test_quickDepositAndWithdraw() public {
//// SETUP
// accounting (to proof attack): save the rewardBalance of alice.
uint112 stakeAmount = 10_000;

// start stream and fill it
(
uint32 maxDepositLockDuration,
uint32 maxRewardLockDuration,
uint32 maxStreamDuration,
uint32 minStreamDuration
) = defaultStreamFactory.streamParams();

uint64 nextStream = defaultStreamFactory.currStreamId();
Stream stream = defaultStreamFactory.createStream(
uint32(block.timestamp + 10),
maxStreamDuration,
maxDepositLockDuration,
0,
false
// false,
// bytes32(0)
);

stream.fundStream(1_000_000_000);

// wait till the stream starts
hevm.warp(block.timestamp + 16);
hevm.roll(block.number + 1);

// just interact with contract to fill "lastUpdate" and "ts.lastUpdate"
// without changing balances inside of Streaming contract
alice.doWithdraw(stream, stakeAmount);

///// ATTACK COMES HERE
// stake

// wait a block
hevm.roll(block.number + 1);
hevm.warp(block.timestamp + 16);

// withdraw soon thereafter
alice.doWithdraw(stream, stakeAmount);

// finish the stream
hevm.roll(block.number + 9999);
hevm.warp(block.timestamp + maxDepositLockDuration);

// get reward
alice.doClaimReward(stream);

// accounting (to proof attack): save the rewardBalance of alice / save balance of stakeToken

// Stream returned everything we gave it
// (doStake sets balance of alice out of thin air => we compare end balance against our (thin air) balance)
assert(stakeAmount == EndBalanceB);

// we gained reward token without risk
assert(StartBalanceA == 0);
assert(StartBalanceA < EndBalanceA);
emit log_named_uint("alice gained", EndBalanceA);
}
##### commandline
    dapp test --verbosity=2 --match "test_quickDepositAndWithdraw" 2> /dev/null
Running 1 tests for src/test/Locke.t.sol:StreamTest
[PASS] test_quickDepositAndWithdraw() (gas: 4501209)

Success: test_quickDepositAndWithdraw

alice gained: 13227

#### Tools Used

dapptools

Ensure staked tokens can not generate reward tokens without streaming deposit tokens. First idea that comes to mind is making following line https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L220 dependable on a positive amount > 0 of: https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L229

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) confirmed

## [H-07] Business logic bug in __abdicate() function - 2 Bugs

Submitted by cyberboy, also found by Meta0xNull

#### Impact

The \__abdicate() function at https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/main/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L46-L50 is the logic to remove the governance i.e., to renounce governance. However, the function logic does not consider emergency governor and pending governor, which can be a backdoor as only the “gov” is set to zero address while the emergency and pending gov remains. A pending gov can just claim and become the gov again, replacing the zero address.

#### Proof of Concept

1. Compile the contract and set the \_GOVERNOR and \_EMERGENCY_GOVERNOR.
2. Now set a pendingGov but do not call acceptGov()

Bug 1

1. Call the \__abdicate() function and we will notice only “gov” is set to zero address while emergency gov remains.

Bug2

1. Now use the address used in pendingGov to call acceptGov() function.
2. We will notice the new gov has been updated to the new address from the zero address.

Hence the \__abdicate() functionality can be used as a backdoor using emergency governor or leaving a pending governor to claim later.

#### Tools Used

Remix to test the proof of concept.

The \__abdicate() function should set emergency_gov and pendingGov as well to zero address.

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) confirmed and disagreed with severity:

Yes, the governor can be recovered from abdication if pendingGov != 0 as well as emergency gov needs to be set to 0 before abdication because it won’t be able to abdicate itself.

Would consider it to be medium risk because chances of it ever being called are slim as it literally would cutoff the protocol from being able to capture its fees.

0xean (judge) commented:

Given that the functionality and vulnerability exists, and the governor does claim fees, this could lead to the loss of funds. Based on the documentation for C4, that would qualify as high severity.

3 — High: Assets can be stolen/lost/compromised directly (or indirectly if there is a valid attack path that does not have hand-wavy hypotheticals).

## [H-08] ts.tokens sometimes calculated incorrectly

Submitted by gpersoon, also found by WatchPug

#### Impact

Suppose someone stakes some tokens and then withdraws all of his tokens (he can still withdraw). This will result in ts.tokens being 0.

Now after some time he stakes some tokens again. At the second stake updateStream() is called and the following if condition is false because ts.tokens==0

  if (acctTimeDelta > 0 && ts.tokens > 0) {

Thus ts.lastUpdate is not updated and stays at the value from the first withdraw. Now he does a second withdraw. updateStream() is called an calculates the updated value of ts.tokens. However it uses ts.lastUpdate, which is the time from the first withdraw and not from the second stake. So the value of ts.token is calculated incorrectly. Thus more tokens can be withdrawn than you are supposed to be able to withdraw.

#### Proof of Concept

https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L417-L447

function stake(uint112 amount) public lock updateStream(msg.sender) {
...
uint112 trueDepositAmt = uint112(newBal - prevBal);
...
ts.tokens += trueDepositAmt;

https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L455-L479

function withdraw(uint112 amount) public lock updateStream(msg.sender) {
...
ts.tokens -= amount;

https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L203-L250

function updateStreamInternal(address who) internal {
...
uint32 acctTimeDelta = uint32(block.timestamp) - ts.lastUpdate;
if (acctTimeDelta > 0 && ts.tokens > 0) {
// some time has passed since this user last interacted
// update ts not yet streamed
ts.tokens -= uint112(acctTimeDelta * ts.tokens / (endStream - ts.lastUpdate));
ts.lastUpdate = uint32(block.timestamp);
}

Change the code in updateStream() to:

if (acctTimeDelta > 0 ) {
// some time has passed since this user last interacted
// update ts not yet streamed
if (ts.tokens > 0)
ts.tokens -= uint112(acctTimeDelta * ts.tokens / (endStream - ts.lastUpdate));
ts.lastUpdate = uint32(block.timestamp);  // always update ts.lastUpdate (if time has elapsed)
}

Note: the next if statement with unstreamed and lastUpdate can be changed in a similar way to save some gas

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) confirmed:

Nice catch :)

## [H-09] DOS while dealing with erc20 when value(i.e amount*decimals) is high but less than type(uint112).max

Submitted by hack3r-0m

#### Impact

https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/main/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L229

reverts due to overflow for higher values (but strictly less than type(uint112).max) and hence when user calls exit or withdraw function it will revert and that user will not able to withdraw funds permanentaly.

#### Proof of Concept

Attaching diff to modify tests to reproduce behaviour:

diff --git a/Streaming/src/test/Locke.t.sol b/Streaming/src/test/Locke.t.sol
index 2be8db0..aba19ce 100644
--- a/Streaming/src/test/Locke.t.sol
+++ b/Streaming/src/test/Locke.t.sol
@@ -166,14 +166,14 @@ contract StreamTest is LockeTest {
);

-        stream.fundStream((10**14)*10**18);
+        stream.fundStream(1000);

hevm.warp(startTime + minStreamDuration / 2); // move to half done

hevm.warp(startTime + minStreamDuration / 2 + minStreamDuration / 10);

@@ -182,10 +182,10 @@ contract StreamTest is LockeTest {
hevm.warp(startTime + minStreamDuration + 1); // warp to end of stream

-        // alice.doClaimReward(stream);
-        // bob.doClaimReward(stream);
+        alice.doClaimReward(stream);
+        bob.doClaimReward(stream);
}

function test_stake() public {
diff --git a/Streaming/src/test/utils/LockeTest.sol b/Streaming/src/test/utils/LockeTest.sol
index eb38060..a479875 100644
--- a/Streaming/src/test/utils/LockeTest.sol
+++ b/Streaming/src/test/utils/LockeTest.sol
@@ -90,11 +90,11 @@ abstract contract LockeTest is TestHelpers {
testTokenA = ERC20(address(new TestToken("Test Token A", "TTA", 18)));
testTokenB = ERC20(address(new TestToken("Test Token B", "TTB", 18)));
testTokenC = ERC20(address(new TestToken("Test Token C", "TTC", 18)));



#### Tools Used

Manual Review

Consider doing arithmetic operations in two steps or upcasting to u256 and then downcasting. Alternatively, find a threshold where it breaks and add require condition to not allow total stake per user greater than threshhold.

## [H-10] recoverTokens doesn’t work when isSale is true

Submitted by harleythedog, also found by kenzo, pedroais, hyh, and pauliax

#### Impact

In recoverTokens, the logic to calculate the excess number of deposit tokens in the contract is:

uint256 excess = ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - (depositTokenAmount - redeemedDepositTokens);

This breaks in the case where isSale is true and the deposit tokens have already been claimed through the use of creatorClaimSoldTokens. In this case, redemeedDepositTokens will be zero, and depositTokenAmount will still be at its original value when the streaming ended. As a result, any attempts to recover deposit tokens from the contract would either revert or send less tokens than should be sent, since the logic above would still think that there are the full amount of deposit tokens in the contract. This breaks the functionality of the function completely in this case.

#### Proof of Concept

See the excess calculation here: https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L654

See creatorClaimSoldTokens here: https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/56d81204a00fc949d29ddd277169690318b36821/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L583

Notice that creatorClaimSoldTokens does not change depositTokenAmount or redeemedDepositTokens, so the excess calculation will be incorrect in the case of sales.

#### Tools Used

Inspection

I would recommend setting redeemedDepositTokens to be depositTokenAmount in the function creatorClaimSoldTokens, since claiming the sold tokens is like “redeeming” them in a sense. This would fix the logic issue in recoverTokens.

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) commented

0xean (judge) commented:

upgrading to High as assets would be lost in the case outlined by the warden

3 — High: Assets can be stolen/lost/compromised directly (or indirectly if there is a valid attack path that does not have hand-wavy hypotheticals).

# Medium Risk Findings (5)

## [M-01] LockeERC20 is vulnerable to frontrun attack

Submitted by egjlmn1, also found by itsmeSTYJ, toastedsteaksandwich, and WatchPug

#### Impact

A user can steal another user’s tokens if he frontrun before he changes the allowance.

The approve() function receives an amount to change to. Lets say user A approved user B to take N tokens, and now he wants to change from N to M, if he calls approve(M) the attacker can frontrun, take the N tokens, wait until after the approve transaction, and take another M tokens. And taking N tokens more than the user wanted.

#### Tools Used

Manual code review

Change the approve function to either accept the old amount of allowance and require the current allowance to be equal to that, or change to two different functions that increase and decrease the allowance instead of straight on changing it.

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) acknowledged and disagreed with severity

0xean (judge) commented:

Front running of the approve ERC20 function is pretty well documented and this point and there are some good ways to mitigate this risk. I am going to downgrade to Medium since there are some other requirements for this to actual mean that assets have been lost 2 — Med: Assets not at direct risk, but the function of the protocol or its availability could be impacted, or leak value with a hypothetical attack path with stated assumptions, but external requirements.

## [M-02] Any arbitraryCall gathered airdrop can be stolen with recoverTokens

Submitted by hyh

#### Impact

Any airdrop gathered with arbitraryCall will be immediately lost as an attacker can track arbitraryCall transactions and back run them with calls to recoverTokens, which doesn’t track any tokens besides reward, deposit and incentive tokens, and will give the airdrop away.

#### Proof of Concept

arbitraryCall requires that tokens to be gathered shouldn’t be reward, deposit or incentive tokens: https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/main/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L735

Also, the function doesn’t mark gathered tokens in any way. Thus, the airdrop is freely accessible for anyone to be withdrawn with recoverTokens: https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/main/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L687

Add airdrop tokens balance mapping, record what is gathered in arbitraryCall and prohibit their free withdrawal in recoverTokens similarly to incentives[].

Now:

mapping (address => uint112) public incentives;
...
...
if (incentives[token] > 0) {
...
uint256 excess = ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - incentives[token];
...
}

To be:

mapping (address => uint112) public incentives;
mapping (address => uint112) public airdrops;
...
...
if (incentives[token] > 0) {
...
uint256 excess = ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - incentives[token];
...
}
if (airdrops[token] > 0) {
...
uint256 excess = ERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)) - airdrops[token];
...
}
...
// we do know what airdrop token will be gathered
function arbitraryCall(address who, bytes memory data, address token) public lock externallyGoverned {
...

// get token balances

(bool success, bytes memory _ret) = who.call(data);
require(success);

require(postAirdropBalance <= type(uint112).max, "air_112");
uint112 amt = uint112(postAirdropBalance - preAirdropBalance);
require(amt > 0, "air");
airdrops[token] += amt;

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) disputed:

The intention is that the claim airdrop + transfer is done atomically. Compound-style governance contracts come with this ability out of the box.

0xean (judge) commented:

Going to agree with the warden that as the code is written this is an appropriate risk to call out and be aware of. Downgrading in severity because it relies on external factors but there is no on chain enforcement that this call will be operated correctly and therefore believe it represent a valid concern even if the Sponsor has a mitigation plan in place.

## [M-03] This protocol doesn’t support all fee on transfer tokens

Submitted by 0x0x0x

Some fee on transfer tokens, do not reduce the fee directly from the transferred amount, but subtracts it from remaining balance of sender. Some tokens prefer this approach, to make the amount received by the recipient an exact amount. Therefore, after funds are send to users, balance becomes less than it should be. So this contract does not fully support fee on transfer tokens. With such tokens, user funds can get lost after transfers.

#### Mitigation step

I don’t recommend directly claiming to support fee on transfer tokens. Current contract only supports them, if they reduce the fee from the transfer amount.

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) acknowldedged:

We will make this clear for stream creators

## [M-04] arbitraryCall() can get blocked by an attacker

Submitted by GiveMeTestEther, also found by ScopeLift

#### Impact

arbitraryCall()’s (L733) use case is to claim airdrops by “gov”. If the address “who” is a token that could be send as an incentive by an attacker via createIncentive() then such claim can be made unusable, because on L735 there is a require(incentives\[who] == 0, "inc"); that reverts if a “who” token was received as an incentive.

In this case the the incentives\[who] can be set to 0 by the stream creator by calling claimIncentive() but only after the stream has ended according to require(block.timestamp >= endStream, "stream"); (L520)

If the airdrop is only claimable before the end of the stream, then the airdrop can never be claimed.

If “gov” is not the stream creator then the stream creator must become also the “gov” because claimIncentive() only can be called by the stream creator and the arbitraryCall() only by “gov”. If resetting incentives\[who] to 0 by calling claimIncentive() and arbitraryCall() for the “who” address doesn’t happen atomic, an attacker can send between those two calls again a “who” token.

#### Proof of Concept

• Best option at the moment I can think of is to accept the risk but clearly communicate to users that this can happen

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) acknowledged:

Yep this is the tradeoff being made. To maintain trustlessness, we cannot remove the incentives[who] == 0 check. Additionally, governance shouldn’t be in charge of an arbitrary stream’s recoverTokens function.

The upshot of this is most MerkleDrop contracts are generally external of the token itself and not baked into the ERC20 itself. If a user wants to grief governance, they could continuously createIncentive after the stream creator claims the previous. But it does cost the user.

## [M-05] Storage variable unstreamed can be artificially inflated

Submitted by harleythedog, also found by csanuragjain, gpersoon, hubble, and WatchPug

#### Impact

The storage variable unstreamed keeps track of the global amount of deposit token in the contract that have not been streamed yet. This variable is a public variable, and users that read this variable likely want to use its value to determine whether or not they want to stake in the stream.

The issue here is that unstreamed is incremented on calls to stake, but it is not being decremented on calls to withdraw. As a result, a malicious user could simply stake, immediately withdraw their staked amount, and they will have increased unstreamed. They could do this repeatedly or with large amounts to intentionally inflate unstreamed to be as large as they want.

Other users would see this large amount and be deterred to stake in the stream, since they would get very little reward relative to the large amount of unstreamed deposit tokens that appear to be in the contract. This benefits the attacker as less users will want to stake in the stream, which leaves more rewards for them.

#### Proof of Concept

Notice that stake increments unstreamed but withdraw does not affect unstreamed at all, even though withdraw is indeed removing unstreamed deposit tokens from the contract.

#### Tools Used

Inspection

Add the following line to withdraw to fix this issue:

unstreamed -= amount;

brockelmore (Streaming Protocol) confirmed

# Disclosures

C4 is an open organization governed by participants in the community.

C4 Contests incentivize the discovery of exploits, vulnerabilities, and bugs in smart contracts. Security researchers are rewarded at an increasing rate for finding higher-risk issues. Contest submissions are judged by a knowledgeable security researcher and solidity developer and disclosed to sponsoring developers. C4 does not conduct formal verification regarding the provided code but instead provides final verification.

C4 does not provide any guarantee or warranty regarding the security of this project. All smart contract software should be used at the sole risk and responsibility of users.