Canto Identity Subprotocols contest
Findings & Analysis Report
2023-05-09
Table of contents
- Summary
- Scope
- Severity Criteria
-
- [M-01] ProfilePicture subprotocol is immutably linked by
subprotocolNameto the CID protocol - [M-02] The range of
iteratePRNGlimits the number of Zalgo distortions - [M-03]
characterModifierisuint8but encodes1.38e24different Zalgo distortions - [M-04] Bio Protocol -
tokenURIJSON injection - [M-05] If the underlying NFT is burned, getPFP may return incorrect results
- [M-06] Incorrect emoji displaying
- [M-07] Users can end up buying and paying for a different Tray than the one they were trying to acquire
- [M-08] Bio lines will overflow the buffer for repeated “continuation” characters
- [M-09] Bio NFT incorrectly breaks SVG lines and doesn’t support more than 120 characters effectively
- [M-01] ProfilePicture subprotocol is immutably linked by
-
Low Risk and Non-Critical Issues
- L-01 AVOID USING TX.ORIGIN
- L-02 LOSS OF PRECISION DUE TO ROUNDING
- L-03 Consider using OpenZeppelin’s SafeCast library to prevent unexpected overflows when casting from various type int/uint values
- L-04 Prevent division by 0
- N-01 Named imports can be used
- N-02 AVOID HARDCODED VALUES
- N-03 Include return parameters in NatSpec comments
- N-04 ADD PARAMETER TO EVENT-EMIT
- N-05 NOT USING THE NAMED RETURN VARIABLES ANYWHERE IN THE FUNCTION IS CONFUSING
- N-06 Interchangeable usage of uint and uint256
- N-07 Immutables should be in uppercase
- N-08 Move IF/validation statements to the top of the function when validating input parameters
- N-09 FOR FUNCTIONS, FOLLOW SOLIDITY STANDARD NAMING CONVENTIONS
- N-10 Don’t use numbers without explanation, it’s not a good code practice. It’s possible to use constants.
- N-11 Use underscores for number literals
- N-12 NO SAME VALUE INPUT CONTROL
- N-13 Need Fuzzing test
- N-14 NatSpec comments should be increased in contracts
- N-15 Function writing that does not comply with the Solidity Style Guide
- N-16 Add a timelock to critical functions
- N-17 Long lines are not suitable for the ‘Solidity Style Guide’
- N-18 Assembly Codes Specific – Should Have Comments
- N-19 Critical changes should use two-step procedure
- N-20 Missing NATSPEC
- N-21 Imports can be grouped together
- S-01 Project Upgrade and Stop Scenario should be
-
- Summary
- G-01 Gas overflow during iteration (DoS)
- G-02 State variables only set in the constructor should be declared immutable
- G-03 Failure to check the zero address in the constructor causes the contract to be deployed again
- G-04 By updating
emit, extra emit usage can be reduced - G-05 Emit can be rearranged
- G-06 Use
assemblyto write address storage values - G-07 Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be marked
payable - G-08 Multiple
address/ID mappings can be combined into a singlemappingof anaddress/ID to astruct, where appropriate - G-09 Use a more recent version of solidity
- G-10 The result of function calls should be cached rather than re-calling the function
- G-11 Avoid contract existence checks by using low level calls
- G-12
bytesconstants are more eficient thanstringconstans - G-13 Change
publicfunction visibility toexternal - G-14 Usage of uints/ints smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead
- G-15 Setting the constructor to
payable - G-16 Use nested if and, avoid multiple check combinations
- G-17 Sort Solidity operations using short-circuit mode
- G-18 Use ERC721A instead ERC721
- G-19 Optimize names to save gas
- G-20 Upgrade Solidity’s optimizer
- Disclosures
Overview
About C4
Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers, and individuals with domain expertise in smart contracts.
A C4 audit contest is an event in which community participants, referred to as Wardens, review, audit, or analyze smart contract logic in exchange for a bounty provided by sponsoring projects.
During the audit contest outlined in this document, C4 conducted an analysis of the Canto Identity Subprotocols smart contract system written in Solidity. The audit contest took place between March 17—March 20 2023.
Wardens
101 Wardens contributed reports to the Canto Identity Subprotocols contest:
- 0xAgro
- 0xSmartContract
- 0xdaydream
- 0xnev
- Awesome
- Aymen0909
- BRONZEDISC
- Bauchibred
- Chom
- Deathstore
- Deekshith99
- Diana
- Emmanuel
- Englave
- EvanW
- Fanz
- Haipls
- IceBear
- IgorZuk
- J4de
- JCN
- Jerry0x
- K42
- Kek
- Kresh
- Madalad
- Matin
- MiniGlome
- Parad0x
- Polaris_tow
- Rageur
- Rappie
- Respx
- ReyAdmirado
- Rolezn
- Ruhum
- SAAJ
- SaeedAlipoor01988
- Sathish9098
- Shubham
- Stryder
- SunSec
- T1MOH
- Udsen
- Viktor_Cortess
- Walter
- Wander (xAlismx, ubl4nk, and mahdikarimi)
- adriro
- alejandrocovrr
- anodaram
- arialblack14
- atharvasama
- bin2chen
- caspersolangii
- cccz
- chaduke
- codeslide
- cryptonue
- d3e4
- dec3ntraliz3d
- descharre
- dicethedev
- dingo2077
- djxploit
- fatherOfBlocks
- felipe
- fs0c
- ginlee
- glcanvas
- hihen
- igingu
- jack
- jasonxiale
- joestakey
- juancito
- leopoldjoy
- libratus
- lukris02
- luxartvinsec
- m9800
- mjmoonwalker
- mojito_auditor
- nadin
- nasri136
- pipoca
- popular00
- reassor
- rokso
- scokaf (Scoon and jauvany)
- shark
- slvDev
- tnevler
- turvy_fuzz
- ulqiorra
- vagrant
- viking71
- volodya
- wait
This contest was judged by 0xleastwood.
Final report assembled by liveactionllama.
Summary
The C4 analysis yielded an aggregated total of 10 unique vulnerabilities. Of these vulnerabilities, 1 received a risk rating in the category of HIGH severity and 9 received a risk rating in the category of MEDIUM severity.
Additionally, C4 analysis included 48 reports detailing issues with a risk rating of LOW severity or non-critical. There were also 41 reports recommending gas optimizations.
All of the issues presented here are linked back to their original finding.
Scope
The code under review can be found within the C4 Canto Identity Subprotocols contest repository, and is composed of 1 library and 4 smart contracts written in the Solidity programming language and includes 687 lines of Solidity code.
Severity Criteria
C4 assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities based on three primary risk categories: high, medium, and low/non-critical.
High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:
- Malicious Input Handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use
For more information regarding the severity criteria referenced throughout the submission review process, please refer to the documentation provided on the C4 website, specifically our section on Severity Categorization.
High Risk Findings (1)
[H-01] Users will be able to purchase fewer NFTs than the project had anticipated
Submitted by volodya, also found by m9800, Emmanuel, IgorZuk, dec3ntraliz3d, igingu, adriro, Rappie, and descharre
Users will be able to purchase fewer NFTs than the project had anticipated. The project had expected that users would be able to purchase a range of variations using both text and emoji characters. However, in reality, users will only be able to purchase a range of variations using emoji characters.
For example, the list of characters available for users to choose from is as follows
For instance, if a user chooses to mint an NFT namespace using font class 2 and the single letter 𝒶, then theoretically all other users should be able to mint font class 0 using the first emoji in the list, font class 1 using the single letter “a,” font class 3 using the single letter 𝓪, and so on, the first letter on every class will be. However, in reality, they will not be able to do so.
I consider this to be a critical issue because the project may not be able to sell as many NFTs as expected, potentially resulting in a loss of funds.
Here is an how nft name and their svg will look like from what I described above. As you can see emoji replaced letters in the name.
This is a function that creates namespace out of tray.
canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol#L110
function fuse(CharacterData[] calldata _characterList) external {
uint256 numCharacters = _characterList.length;
if (numCharacters > 13 || numCharacters == 0) revert InvalidNumberOfCharacters(numCharacters);
uint256 fusingCosts = 2**(13 - numCharacters) * 1e18;
SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(note, msg.sender, revenueAddress, fusingCosts);
uint256 namespaceIDToMint = ++nextNamespaceIDToMint;
Tray.TileData[] storage nftToMintCharacters = nftCharacters[namespaceIDToMint];
bytes memory bName = new bytes(numCharacters * 33); // Used to convert into a string. Can be 33 times longer than the string at most (longest zalgo characters is 33 bytes)
uint256 numBytes;
// Extract unique trays for burning them later on
uint256 numUniqueTrays;
uint256[] memory uniqueTrays = new uint256[](_characterList.length);
for (uint256 i; i < numCharacters; ++i) {
bool isLastTrayEntry = true;
uint256 trayID = _characterList[i].trayID;
uint8 tileOffset = _characterList[i].tileOffset;
// Check for duplicate characters in the provided list. 1/2 * n^2 loop iterations, but n is bounded to 13 and we do not perform any storage operations
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < numCharacters; ++j) {
if (_characterList[j].trayID == trayID) {
isLastTrayEntry = false;
if (_characterList[j].tileOffset == tileOffset) revert FusingDuplicateCharactersNotAllowed();
}
}
Tray.TileData memory tileData = tray.getTile(trayID, tileOffset); // Will revert if tileOffset is too high
uint8 characterModifier = tileData.characterModifier;
if (tileData.fontClass != 0 && _characterList[i].skinToneModifier != 0) {
revert CannotFuseCharacterWithSkinTone();
}
if (tileData.fontClass == 0) {
// Emoji
characterModifier = _characterList[i].skinToneModifier;
}
bytes memory charAsBytes = Utils.characterToUnicodeBytes(0, tileData.characterIndex, characterModifier);
... canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol#L110
There is a bug in this line of code where a character is retrieved from tile data. Instead of passing tileData.fontClass, we are passing 0.
bytes memory charAsBytes = Utils.characterToUnicodeBytes(0, tileData.characterIndex, characterModifier);Due to this bug, the names for all four different font classes will be the same. As a result, they will point to an existing namespace, and later, there will be a check for the existence of that name (token) using NameAlreadyRegistered.
string memory nameToRegister = string(bName);
uint256 currentRegisteredID = nameToToken[nameToRegister];
if (currentRegisteredID != 0) revert NameAlreadyRegistered(currentRegisteredID);Proof of Concept
Here is the test that you can run
function testFailMintSameCharacterIndex() public {
address user = user1;
note.mint(user, 10000e18);
endPrelaunchAndBuyOne(user);
uint256[] memory trayIds = buyTray(user, 3);
vm.startPrank(user);
note.approve(address(ns), type(uint256).max);
Namespace.CharacterData[] memory list = new Namespace.CharacterData[](
1
);
// fuse tile with fontClass=8,characterIndex=1
list[0] = Namespace.CharacterData(trayIds[1], 4, 0);
Tray.TileData memory tileData = tray.getTile(trayIds[1], 4);
console.log(tileData.characterIndex);//1
console.log(tileData.fontClass);//8
ns.fuse(list);
// fuse tile with fontClass=4,characterIndex=1
list[0] = Namespace.CharacterData(trayIds[2], 3, 0);
tileData = tray.getTile(trayIds[2], 3);
console.log(tileData.characterIndex);//1
console.log(tileData.fontClass);//4
vm.expectRevert(
abi.encodeWithSelector(Namespace.NameAlreadyRegistered.selector, 1)
);
ns.fuse(list);
}Tools Used
Manual review, forge tests
Recommended Mitigation Steps
Pass font class instead of 0
- bytes memory charAsBytes = Utils.characterToUnicodeBytes(0, tileData.characterIndex, characterModifier);
+ bytes memory charAsBytes = Utils.characterToUnicodeBytes(tileData.fontClass, tileData.characterIndex, characterModifier);OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) confirmed and commented:
Agree, leftover from earlier, will be changed.
Medium Risk Findings (9)
[M-01] ProfilePicture subprotocol is immutably linked by subprotocolName to the CID protocol
Submitted by d3e4
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol#L59
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol#L99
Besides having to re-register the protocol, it will also have to be redeployed.
Proof of Concept
A protocol is registered by name in the SubprotocolRegistry. Quoting the Canto Identity Protocol contest details:
“In theory, someone can front-run a call to SubprotocolRegistry.register with the same name, causing the original call to fail. There is a registration fee (
100 $NOTE) and the damage is very limited (original registration call fails, user can just re-register under a different name), so this attack is not deemed feasible.”
However, the ProfilePicture subprotocol suffers from the additional issue of also having to be redeployed, making this exploit more severe.
In ProfilePicture, subprotocolName is set on construction.
constructor(address _cidNFT, string memory _subprotocolName) ERC721("Profile Picture", "PFP") {
cidNFT = ICidNFT(_cidNFT);
subprotocolName = _subprotocolName;subprotocolName is used to retrieve the cidNFTID to which the subprotocols NFT is added.
uint256 cidNFTID = cidNFT.getPrimaryCIDNFT(subprotocolName, _pfpID);
IAddressRegistry addressRegistry = cidNFT.addressRegistry();
if (cidNFTID == 0 || addressRegistry.getAddress(cidNFTID) != ERC721(nftContract).ownerOf(nftID)) {
nftContract = address(0);
nftID = 0; // Strictly not needed because nftContract has to be always checked, but reset nevertheless to 0
}This means that this subprotocol must be registered under this name, or it will not work. So if ProfilePicture is deployed but someone else manages to register it in the SubprotocolRegistry before the owner (recipient of fees) of ProfilePicture (by frontrunning or otherwise), it cannot simply be re-registered under a different name, but would have to be redeployed with a new name under which it then can be registered.
Recommended Mitigation Steps
Since the subprotocol is meant to be registered with the CID protocol, its deployment and registration should be atomic. Or the name can be initialized after deployment and registration, and set by a (temporary) owner to the name it then has been registered with.
OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) acknowledged and commented:
We will do deployment and registration in one transaction, but the issue is generally true.
[M-02] The range of iteratePRNG limits the number of Zalgo distortions
Submitted by d3e4
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol#L136-L174
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol#L256-L261
Only a tiny fraction of all Zalgo distortions are accessible.
Proof of Concept
In characterToUnicodeBytes, for font class 7 (i.e. Zalgo), the _characterModifier determines the Zalgo distortion.
The distortion is pseudo-randomly calculated by using _characterModifier as a seed and iteratively passing it through iteratePRNG, each intermediate value being used to set, in turn, each component of the distortion.
} else if (_fontClass == 7) {
// Zalgo
uint8 asciiStartingIndex = 97;
uint256 numAbove = (_characterModifier % 7) + 1;
// We do not reuse the same seed for the following generations to avoid any symmetries, e.g. that 2 chars above would also always result in 2 chars below
_characterModifier = iteratePRNG(_characterModifier);
uint256 numMiddle = _characterModifier % 2;
_characterModifier = iteratePRNG(_characterModifier);
uint256 numBelow = (_characterModifier % 7) + 1;
// ...This has the effect that the initial seed value generates a stream of values, equidistributed within their respective ranges.
A Zalgo tile is defined by a letter and a modification consisting of a combination of characters above, over and below the letter. The modification consists of a selection of 1 up to 7 characters from a set of 46 characters above the letter, 0 or 1 from 5 over the letter, and 1 to 7 from 47 below the letter. Thus there is a total of $(46^1 + 46^2 + ... + 46^7)*(5^0 + 5^1)*(47^1 + 47^2 + ... + 47^7) = 1.38e24$ different Zalgo modifications possible per letter.
However, iteratePRNG modulates its return value by 2038074743:
function iteratePRNG(uint256 _currState) internal pure returns (uint256 iteratedState) {
unchecked {
iteratedState = _currState * 15485863;
iteratedState = (iteratedState * iteratedState * iteratedState) % 2038074743;
}
}This means that after the first pass through iteratePRNG we only have 2038074743 different possibilities which will determine the rest of the distortion. The original _characterModifier is first used to set to uint256 numAbove = (_characterModifier % 7) + 1;. The remaining combinations are therefore 1.38e24 / 7 = 1.98e+23, which is vastly greater than 2038074743.
characterToUnicodeBytes can thus only return 7 * 2038074743 = 14266523201 different distortions per letter, which is only a tiny fraction of the actual number of distortions.
Note that it is similarly an issue that the range of _characterModifier is only 0..255, which issue is reportedly separately.
Recommended Mitigation Steps
iteratePRNG must have a range of at least 1.98e+23 different values.
OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) acknowledged
[M-03] characterModifier is uint8 but encodes 1.38e24 different Zalgo distortions
Submitted by d3e4
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L163
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol#L264-L268
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol#L136-L174
Only 256 Zalgo distortions are possible, which is a miniscule fraction of the actual combinations possible.
Proof of Concept
A Zalgo tile is defined by a letter and a modification consisting of a combination of characters above, over and below the letter. The modification consists of a selection of 1 up to 7 characters from a set of 46 characters above the letter, 0 or 1 from 5 over the letter, and 1 to 7 from 47 below the letter. Thus there is a total of $(46^1 + 46^2 + ... + 46^7)*(5^0 + 5^1)*(47^1 + 47^2 + ... + 47^7) = 1.38e24$ different Zalgo modifications possible per letter.
However, the distortions are uniquely determined by characterModifier which is a uint8. So only 256 different distortions per letter are possible.
When a tray is bought, _drawing sets the tile,
function buy(uint256 _amount) external {
// ...
trayTiledata[j] = _drawing(uint256(lastHash));
// ...
}and, if luck would have it that it is a Zalgo tile, characterModifier is set to a pseudo-random uint8, i.e. in the range 0..255.
function _drawing(uint256 _seed) private pure returns (TileData memory tileData) {
// ...
if (tileData.fontClass == 7) {
// Set seed for Zalgo to ensure same characters will be always generated for this tile
uint256 zalgoSeed = Utils.iteratePRNG(_seed);
tileData.characterModifier = uint8(zalgoSeed % 256);
// ...
}This characterModifier uniquely determines the distortion in characterToUnicodeBytes at L136-L174:
} else if (_fontClass == 7) {
// Zalgo
uint8 asciiStartingIndex = 97;
uint256 numAbove = (_characterModifier % 7) + 1;
// We do not reuse the same seed for the following generations to avoid any symmetries, e.g. that 2 chars above would also always result in 2 chars below
_characterModifier = iteratePRNG(_characterModifier);
uint256 numMiddle = _characterModifier % 2;
_characterModifier = iteratePRNG(_characterModifier);
uint256 numBelow = (_characterModifier % 7) + 1;
bytes memory character = abi.encodePacked(bytes1(asciiStartingIndex + uint8(_characterIndex)));
for (uint256 i; i < numAbove; ++i) {
_characterModifier = iteratePRNG(_characterModifier);
uint256 characterIndex = (_characterModifier % ZALGO_NUM_ABOVE) * 2;
character = abi.encodePacked(
character,
ZALGO_ABOVE_LETTER[characterIndex],
ZALGO_ABOVE_LETTER[characterIndex + 1]
);
}
for (uint256 i; i < numMiddle; ++i) {
_characterModifier = iteratePRNG(_characterModifier);
uint256 characterIndex = (_characterModifier % ZALGO_NUM_OVER) * 2;
character = abi.encodePacked(
character,
ZALGO_OVER_LETTER[characterIndex],
ZALGO_OVER_LETTER[characterIndex + 1]
);
}
for (uint256 i; i < numBelow; ++i) {
_characterModifier = iteratePRNG(_characterModifier);
uint256 characterIndex = (_characterModifier % ZALGO_NUM_BELOW) * 2;
character = abi.encodePacked(
character,
ZALGO_BELOW_LETTER[characterIndex],
ZALGO_BELOW_LETTER[characterIndex + 1]
);
}
return character;
} else {Note that there is also a similar bottleneck issue with iteratePRNG, which is reported as a separate issue.
Recommended Mitigation Steps
Let characterModifier have a range of at least 0..1.38e24. Since it therefore cannot be a uint8, simply let it be a uint256 (or at least a uint88).
OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) acknowledged and commented:
Addressing M-02 (issue 282) and M-03 (issue 277) here because they are very similar: Both issues are technically true and well written, but 256 different distortions are more than enough in my opinion and there is no need to have
1.38e24.
@OpenCoreCH - It’s of course up to you what you eventually implement, but I would just like to offer my perspective on why you might actually want to make the corrections suggested in
#277and#282.256 distortions may seem plenty, but there are already 98 combinations just in terms of the number of diacritics above, in the middle, and below (727). Currently five such combinations are not even generated at all, viz. (2,1,7), (3,0,6), (3,1,1), (5,0,6), (6,1,5), where the combinations are represented as (numAbove, numMiddle, numBelow).
Even if all possible distortions were reachable, a user couldn’t feasibly obtain a specific distortion of his choosing, but he might desire some class of distortions. If this class is any of the above missing combinations of numbers of diacritics he evidently cannot obtain it. But even if 14266523201 distortions are available (
#282) the chances that these overlap with his own desired class is minuscule, as these are only 0.000000000001% of all possible Zalgo distortions promised by the parameters.And with only 256 distortions they will have to be reused. Different users will share identical distortions, and there may even be duplicates in the same tray. This would be exceedingly unlikely if the full range of distortions were available.
If the goal is simply to offer only 256 different distortions, then the protocol currently achieves this. (But in this case I wonder if it wouldn’t be more gas efficient to simply hardcode these and pick one randomly instead of generating them in the current complicated manner.) But the protocol gives the impression (if not promise?) of offering a distortion synthesised from a range of diacritics, which might leave the user feeling cheated. For example, none of the Zalgos in the docs are available.
[M-04] Bio Protocol - tokenURI JSON injection
Submitted by reassor, also found by Wander, ulqiorra, ulqiorra, mjmoonwalker, reassor, dingo2077, Jerry0x, Parad0x, adriro, Kek, Kek, Respx, Viktor_Cortess, Viktor_Cortess, Haipls, J4de, Haipls, Englave, bin2chen, MiniGlome, djxploit, jasonxiale, and rokso
The Bio Protocol allows users to mint Bio NFTs that represent user’s bio. Once NFT is minted anyone can trigger tokenURI to retrieve JSON data with the bio and generated svg image. Example JSON content (decoded from Base64):
{"name": "Bio #1", "description": "Test", "image": ""}The issue is that function Bio.tokenURI is vulnerable to JSON injection and it is possible to inject " character into bio completely altering the integrity of JSON data. User sends following data as bio:
Test\", \"name\": \"Bio #999999999This is will result in following JSON data (new name key was injected):
{"name": "Bio #1", "description": "Test", "name": "Bio #999999999", "image": ""}Depending on the usage of Bio Protocol by frontend or 3rd party applications this will have serious impact on the security. Some examples of the attacks that can be carried:
- Attacker might create a Bio NFT that mimics copies the name of different Bio NFT.
- Attacker might change the generated svg
imageto completely different one. - Attacker might point
imageto externalURL. - Attacker might trigger cross-site scripting attacks if the data from JSON is not properly handled.
Proof of Concept
Tools Used
Manual Review / Foundry / VSCode
Recommended Mitigation Steps
It is recommended to properly encode user’s bio to make sure it cannot alter returned JSON data.
OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) disagreed with severity and commented:
Good point that will be fixed, have some doubts about the severity. The attacks that are mentioned on the frontend in various issues (XSS / external resources) should be handled there in any case because the payload of a NFT should not be considered trusted. And if a user manipulates his own NFT, the impact is limited to him.
0xleastwood (judge) commented:
@OpenCoreCH - It doesn’t seem like this sort of
tokenURI()sanitisation can be made within the contract but instead must be handled by front-ends right?
OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) commented:
@0xleastwood - I implemented some sanitisation in the mean time (escaping all characters that need to be escaped for the JSON / SVG) using Solady’s escape functions. But that’s mainly to ensure that the produced JSON / SVG will always be valid (and the user does not accidentally produce an invalid one by choosing some characters in his bio). I think perfect sanitisation on-chain is not feasible in practice and the frontends should generally treat this payload as untrusted and sanitise it. Otherwise, you could also actively deploy malicious NFTs to e.g. target NFT marketplace users.
0xleastwood (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
@OpenCoreCH - Completely agree. I think medium severity would make more sense then.
[M-05] If the underlying NFT is burned, getPFP may return incorrect results
Submitted by cccz
ProfilePicture.getPFP will return information about the underlying NFT and when addressRegistry.getAddress(cidNFTID) ! = ERC721(nftContract).ownerOf(nftID), it will return 0.
But if the underlying NFT is burned, getPFP may return incorrect information
function getPFP(uint256 _pfpID) public view returns (address nftContract, uint256 nftID) {
if (_ownerOf[_pfpID] == address(0)) revert TokenNotMinted(_pfpID);
ProfilePictureData storage pictureData = pfp[_pfpID];
nftContract = pictureData.nftContract;
nftID = pictureData.nftID;
uint256 cidNFTID = cidNFT.getPrimaryCIDNFT(subprotocolName, _pfpID);
IAddressRegistry addressRegistry = cidNFT.addressRegistry();
if (cidNFTID == 0 || addressRegistry.getAddress(cidNFTID) != ERC721(nftContract).ownerOf(nftID)) {
nftContract = address(0);
nftID = 0; // Strictly not needed because nftContract has to be always checked, but reset nevertheless to 0
}
}Consider the following scenario.
- Alice mints a ProfilePicture NFT (pfp NFT) with the underlying NFT, and later mints a CidNFT by transferring the pfp NFT to the CidNFT contract.
Noting that alice does not call AddressRegistry.register to register the CidNFT.
Since getAddress returns 0, ProfilePicture.getPFP will also return 0.
function getAddress(uint256 _cidNFTID) external view returns (address user) {
user = ERC721(cidNFT).ownerOf(_cidNFTID);
if (_cidNFTID != cidNFTs[user]) {
// User owns CID NFT, but has not registered it
user = address(0);
}
}- Alice sends the underlying NFT to Bob, who does what Alice did before.
- Bob sold the underlying NFT to Charlie and Charlie burned it for some reason, now if Alice or Bob calls ProfilePicture.getPFP(), it will return the contract address and id of the underlying NFT since
getAddress() == ownerOf() == address(0).
When integrating with other projects, there may be bugs because getPFP returns an incorrect result.
Proof of Concept
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol#L94-L105
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/077372297fc419ea7688ab62cc3fd4e8f4e24e66/canto-identity-protocol/src/AddressRegistry.sol#L86-L92
Recommended Mitigation Steps
Change to
function getPFP(uint256 _pfpID) public view returns (address nftContract, uint256 nftID) {
if (_ownerOf[_pfpID] == address(0)) revert TokenNotMinted(_pfpID);
ProfilePictureData storage pictureData = pfp[_pfpID];
nftContract = pictureData.nftContract;
nftID = pictureData.nftID;
uint256 cidNFTID = cidNFT.getPrimaryCIDNFT(subprotocolName, _pfpID);
IAddressRegistry addressRegistry = cidNFT.addressRegistry();
- if (cidNFTID == 0 || addressRegistry.getAddress(cidNFTID) != ERC721(nftContract).ownerOf(nftID)) {
+ if (cidNFTID == 0 || ERC721(nftContract).ownerOf(nftID) == 0 || addressRegistry.getAddress(cidNFTID) != ERC721(nftContract).ownerOf(nftID)) {
nftContract = address(0);
nftID = 0; // Strictly not needed because nftContract has to be always checked, but reset nevertheless to 0
}
}OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) confirmed and commented:
Very interesting edge case, enjoyed reading it! For an ERC721 compliant NFT this is not the case, because the standard explicitly says:
/// @dev NFTs assigned to zero address are considered invalid, and queries /// about them do throw.Therefore, the existing
ownerOfwill throw.However, in my experience there are some NFTs that do not adhere strictly to ERC721 when it comes to this. Because of that, I’ll still implement a fix for this.
[M-06] Incorrect emoji displaying
Submitted by glcanvas, also found by fs0c and adriro
Possible to split bio incorrectly, this leads to incorrect display of generated image. This image will be impossible to modify. This might lead to integration problems.
Proof of Concept
Let’s consider tokenURI function of the Bio contract.
Here implemented corner case for some emojis, but current implementation doesn’t handle all cases. I suppose handling all cases is redundant, erroneously, complicated and unnecessary.
Let’s consider part of tokenURI code in python, this part just rewritten on Python part of Solidity code:
import binascii
def sol_func_same(bio):
bioTextBytes = str.encode(bio, "utf-8")
lengthInBytes = len(bioTextBytes)
lines = (lengthInBytes - 1) // 40 + 1
strLines = [None for _ in range(lines)]
prevByteWasContinuation = False
insertedLines = 0
bytesLines = []
bytesOffset = 0
for i in range(0, lengthInBytes):
character = bioTextBytes[i]
bytesLines.append(character)
bytesOffset += 1
if ((i > 0 and (i + 1) % 40 == 0) or prevByteWasContinuation or i == lengthInBytes - 1):
nextCharacter = 0
if (i != lengthInBytes - 1): # 🏴
nextCharacter = bioTextBytes[i + 1]
if (nextCharacter & 0xC0 == 0x80):
prevByteWasContinuation = True
else:
if (
(nextCharacter == 0xE2 and bioTextBytes[i + 2] == 0x80 and bioTextBytes[i + 3] == 0x8D) or
(nextCharacter == 0xF0 and
bioTextBytes[i + 2] == 0x9F and
bioTextBytes[i + 3] == 0x8F and
int(bioTextBytes[i + 4]) >= 187 and
int(bioTextBytes[i + 4]) <= 191) or
(i >= 2 and
bioTextBytes[i - 2] == 0xE2 and
bioTextBytes[i - 1] == 0x80 and
bioTextBytes[i] == 0x8D)
):
prevByteWasContinuation = True
continue
strLines[insertedLines] = binascii.unhexlify(''.join([hex(x)[2:] for x in bytesLines])).decode("utf-8")
insertedLines += 1
bytesLines = []
prevByteWasContinuation = False
bytesOffset = 0
for idx, i in enumerate(strLines):
print(idx, i)
if __name__ == "__main__":
sol_func_same("0🏴")
print("===" * 20)
sol_func_same("000000000000000000000000000000🏴")The result is:
0 0🏴
============================================================
0 000000000000000000000000000000🏴
1 In the second line present 31 character.
but correct answer for the second case is:
000000000000000000000000000000🏴This happened because Eng flag presented with combination of different emojis, this case isn’t handled by contract.
Similar test might be added to the Bio.t.sol contract:
function testSmallLine() public {
string memory text = unicode"000🏴";
bio.mint(text);
string memory result = bio.tokenURI(1);
console.logString(result);
}
function testLongLine() public {
string memory text = unicode"000000000000000000000000000000🏴";
bio.mint(text);
string memory result = bio.tokenURI(1);
console.logString(result);
}You need to decode them and you’ll receive the same incorrect result.
Tools Used
Manual audit, Python3
Recommended Mitigation Steps
Do not try to implement spec by themselves.
- Add view function which is responsible to create svg image. In tokenURI call this function to generate svg result.
Like this:
function generateSvg(string memory bioText) public view returns(string) {
bytes memory bioTextBytes = bytes(bioText);
uint lengthInBytes = bioTextBytes.length;
// Insert a new line after 40 characters, taking into account unicode character
uint lines = (lengthInBytes - 1) / 40 + 1;
...
...
...
return string(abi.encodePacked("data:application/json;base64,", json));
}- Add possibility to manual split by lines. i.e. with bio additionally store offsets in bytes, by which lines must be split.
function mint(string calldata _bio, uint256[] calldata byteSplit) external {
...
}
function generateSvg(string memory bioText, uint256[] memory byteSplit) public view returns(string) {
...
bytes memory bioTextBytes = bytes(bioText);
in for loop:
slice = bioTextBytes[i:i+1]
write slice to svg
}OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) confirmed
[M-07] Users can end up buying and paying for a different Tray than the one they were trying to acquire
Submitted by juancito, also found by luxartvinsec, leopoldjoy, popular00, pipoca, Chom, reassor, igingu, adriro, J4de, and Ruhum
Trays and their tiles are the building blocks for fusing a Namespace NFT. The tiles in a tray are generated based on a hash of the previous mint.
Users will need specific tiles to be able to create the name they want, so it is of utter importance for them to get the trays they want with their corresponding tiles. The users should be able to precompute this, as the documentation states:
“The 7 tiles per tray are then generated according to a deterministic algorithm. A user can therefore precompute which trays he will get.”
Impact
Users can pay the corresponding $NOTE tokens to buy a tray with some specific tiles, buy end up obtaining a completely different one with tiles they don’t expect.
This can happen due to normal usage of the platform, with some user sending a transaction with more gas. Or by a malicious user frontrunning the transaction.
On any case the user ends up with an NFT he didn’t want instead of reverting the transaction, and saving their $NOTE tokens.
Proof of Concept
There is no check on the buy() function to make sure that the user will actually buy the tray he wanted, thus possibly obtaining another one.
The tiles are calculated based on a hash. That hash is generated each time a new mint is produced, and it is based on the last one.
If the transaction is frontrunned, the user will get a new hash, and thus new tiles data for his tray.
File: canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol
148: /// @notice Buy a specifiable amount of trays
149: /// @param _amount Amount of trays to buy
150: function buy(uint256 _amount) external {
151: uint256 startingTrayId = _nextTokenId();
152: if (prelaunchMinted == type(uint256).max) {
153: // Still in prelaunch phase
154: if (msg.sender != owner) revert OnlyOwnerCanMintPreLaunch();
155: if (startingTrayId + _amount - 1 > PRE_LAUNCH_MINT_CAP) revert MintExceedsPreLaunchAmount();
156: } else {
157: SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(note, msg.sender, revenueAddress, _amount * trayPrice);
158: }
159: for (uint256 i; i < _amount; ++i) {
160: TileData[TILES_PER_TRAY] memory trayTiledata;
161: for (uint256 j; j < TILES_PER_TRAY; ++j) {
162: lastHash = keccak256(abi.encode(lastHash)); // @audit-info hash is calculated based on the last one
163: trayTiledata[j] = _drawing(uint256(lastHash)); // @audit-info tiles data is calculated based on the hash
164: }
165: tiles[startingTrayId + i] = trayTiledata;
166: }
167: _mint(msg.sender, _amount); // We do not use _safeMint on purpose here to disallow callbacks and save gas
168: }Recommended Mitigation Steps
Check the hash for the last minted Tray NFT, to make sure it is the same the user used to precalculate the next tiles.
On the case the transaction is frontrunned, the expected hash will be different and the transaction will revert, saving the user from spending the $NOTE tokens.
// File: canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol
/// @notice Buy a specifiable amount of trays
/// @param _amount Amount of trays to buy
- function buy(uint256 _amount) external {
+ function buy(uint256 _amount, bytes32 _lastHash) external {
+ require(_lastHash == lastHash, "Hashes must be the same");
uint256 startingTrayId = _nextTokenId();
if (prelaunchMinted == type(uint256).max) {
// Still in prelaunch phase
if (msg.sender != owner) revert OnlyOwnerCanMintPreLaunch();
if (startingTrayId + _amount - 1 > PRE_LAUNCH_MINT_CAP) revert MintExceedsPreLaunchAmount();
} else {
SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(note, msg.sender, revenueAddress, _amount * trayPrice);
}
for (uint256 i; i < _amount; ++i) {
TileData[TILES_PER_TRAY] memory trayTiledata;
for (uint256 j; j < TILES_PER_TRAY; ++j) {
lastHash = keccak256(abi.encode(lastHash));
trayTiledata[j] = _drawing(uint256(lastHash));
}
tiles[startingTrayId + i] = trayTiledata;
}
_mint(msg.sender, _amount); // We do not use _safeMint on purpose here to disallow callbacks and save gas
}OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) acknowledged
0xleastwood (judge) commented:
While this could be treated as a duplicate of
#121, I like how the warden has provided a remediation which would protect users from being front-run and receiving an unexpected ID.
[M-08] Bio lines will overflow the buffer for repeated “continuation” characters
Submitted by adriro
The Bio tokenURI function splits biography text into lines. The algorithm will take into account certain “continuation” characters to prevent splitting the line in the middle of these characters and keep accumulating those in the current line buffer (bytesLines):
if ((i > 0 && (i + 1) % 40 == 0) || prevByteWasContinuation || i == lengthInBytes - 1) {
bytes1 nextCharacter;
if (i != lengthInBytes - 1) {
nextCharacter = bioTextBytes[i + 1];
}
if (nextCharacter & 0xC0 == 0x80) {
// Unicode continuation byte, top two bits are 10
prevByteWasContinuation = true;
} else {
// Do not split when the prev. or next character is a zero width joiner. Otherwise, 👨👧👦 could become 👨>👧👦
// Furthermore, do not split when next character is skin tone modifier to avoid 🤦♂️\n🏻
if (
// Note that we do not need to check i < lengthInBytes - 4, because we assume that it's a valid UTF8 string and these prefixes imply that another byte follows
(nextCharacter == 0xE2 && bioTextBytes[i + 2] == 0x80 && bioTextBytes[i + 3] == 0x8D) ||
(nextCharacter == 0xF0 &&
bioTextBytes[i + 2] == 0x9F &&
bioTextBytes[i + 3] == 0x8F &&
uint8(bioTextBytes[i + 4]) >= 187 &&
uint8(bioTextBytes[i + 4]) <= 191) ||
(i >= 2 &&
bioTextBytes[i - 2] == 0xE2 &&
bioTextBytes[i - 1] == 0x80 &&
bioTextBytes[i] == 0x8D)
) {
prevByteWasContinuation = true;
continue;
}
assembly {
mstore(bytesLines, bytesOffset)
}
strLines[insertedLines++] = string(bytesLines);
bytesLines = new bytes(80);
prevByteWasContinuation = false;
bytesOffset = 0;
}
}However, if the unicode string is a sequence of these continuation characters (which is a valid UTF8 string) the line buffer (which is 80 bytes) will eventually overflow and will revert the transaction due to an index of out bounds exception.
Proof of Concept
In the following test we use a string with 21 U+1F3FE characters to overflow the line buffer and revert the query to tokenURI.
Note: the snippet shows only the relevant code for the test. Full test file can be found here.
function test_Bio_tokenURI_LineBufferOverflow() public {
// This is a skin tone codepoint ("f09f8fbe") repeated 21 times
string memory text = unicode"🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾🏾";
bio.mint(string(text));
vm.expectRevert();
bio.tokenURI(1);
}Recommendation
Change to a new line when the current line buffer is full.
OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) confirmed and commented:
Extreme edge case with a string that’s technically valid, but semantically meaningless. But it’s technically true.
[M-09] Bio NFT incorrectly breaks SVG lines and doesn’t support more than 120 characters effectively
Submitted by volodya, also found by Haipls
According to the docs
“Any user can mint a Bio NFT by calling Bio.mint and passing his biography. It needs to be shorter than 200 characters.”
Let’s take two strings and pass them to create an NFT. The first one is 200 characters long, and the second one is 120 characters long.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaWaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaWaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaWaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaWaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaW
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaWaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaWaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaW
This is how they will look like. As you can see they look identical.
Next, lets take this text for which we create nft. I took it from a test and double. 012345678901234567890123456789012345678👨👩👧👧012345678901234567890123456789012345678👨👩👧👧
Here is on the left how it looks now vs how it suppose to be. As you can see the line breaking doesn’t work. I did enlarge viewBox so you can see the difference.
The problem is in this part of the code, where (i > 0 && (i + 1) % 40 == 0) doesn’t handle properly because you want to include emojis, so length will be more than 40 (40 + length(emoji))
canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L56
for (uint i; i < lengthInBytes; ++i) {
bytes1 character = bioTextBytes[i];
bytesLines[bytesOffset] = character;
bytesOffset++;
if ((i > 0 && (i + 1) % 40 == 0) || prevByteWasContinuation || i == lengthInBytes - 1) {
bytes1 nextCharacter;canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L56
Lastly, the NFT doesn’t center-align text, but I believe it should. I took text from a test and on the left is how it currently appears, while on the right is how I think it should be.
Here is the code. dy doesn’t apply correctly; it should be 0 for the first line.
canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L104
for (uint i; i < lines; ++i) {
text = string.concat(text, '<tspan x="50%" dy="20">', strLines[i], "</tspan>");
}canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L104
Recommended Mitigation Steps
Enlarge viewBox so it will support 200 length or restrict to 120 characters.
Here is a complete code with correct line breaking and center text. I’m sorry that I didn’t add differ to code because there will be too many lines. It does pass tests and fix current issues.
function tokenURI(uint256 _id) public view override returns (string memory) {
if (_ownerOf[_id] == address(0)) revert TokenNotMinted(_id);
string memory bioText = bio[_id];
bytes memory bioTextBytes = bytes(bioText);
uint lengthInBytes = bioTextBytes.length;
// Insert a new line after 40 characters, taking into account unicode character
uint lines = (lengthInBytes - 1) / 40 + 1;
string[] memory strLines = new string[](lines);
bool prevByteWasContinuation;
uint256 insertedLines;
// Because we do not split on zero-width joiners, line in bytes can technically be much longer. Will be shortened to the needed length afterwards
bytes memory bytesLines = new bytes(80);
uint bytesOffset;
uint j;
for (uint i; i < lengthInBytes; ++i) {
bytesLines[bytesOffset] = bytes1(bioTextBytes[i]);
bytesOffset++;
j+=1;
if ((j>=40) || prevByteWasContinuation || i == lengthInBytes - 1) {
bytes1 nextCharacter;
if (i != lengthInBytes - 1) {
nextCharacter = bioTextBytes[i + 1];
}
if (nextCharacter & 0xC0 == 0x80) {
// Unicode continuation byte, top two bits are 10
prevByteWasContinuation = true;
continue;
} else {
// Do not split when the prev. or next character is a zero width joiner. Otherwise, 👨👧👦 could become 👨>👧👦
// Furthermore, do not split when next character is skin tone modifier to avoid 🤦♂️\n🏻
if (
// Note that we do not need to check i < lengthInBytes - 4, because we assume that it's a valid UTF8 string and these prefixes imply that another byte follows
(nextCharacter == 0xE2 && bioTextBytes[i + 2] == 0x80 && bioTextBytes[i + 3] == 0x8D) ||
(nextCharacter == 0xF0 &&
bioTextBytes[i + 2] == 0x9F &&
bioTextBytes[i + 3] == 0x8F &&
uint8(bioTextBytes[i + 4]) >= 187 &&
uint8(bioTextBytes[i + 4]) <= 191) ||
(i >= 2 &&
bioTextBytes[i - 2] == 0xE2 &&
bioTextBytes[i - 1] == 0x80 &&
bioTextBytes[i] == 0x8D)
) {
prevByteWasContinuation = true;
continue;
}
}
assembly {
mstore(bytesLines, bytesOffset)
}
strLines[insertedLines++] = string(bytesLines);
bytesLines = new bytes(80);
prevByteWasContinuation = false;
bytesOffset = 0;
j=0;
}
}
string
memory svg = '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" preserveAspectRatio="xMinYMin meet" viewBox="0 0 400 100"><style>text { font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 12px; }</style>';
string memory text = '<text x="50%" y="50%" dominant-baseline="middle" text-anchor="middle">';
text = string.concat(text, '<tspan x="50%" dy="0">', strLines[0], "</tspan>");// center first line and than add dy
for (uint i=1; i < lines; ++i) {
text = string.concat(text, '<tspan x="50%" dy="20">', strLines[i], "</tspan>");
}
string memory json = Base64.encode(
bytes(
string.concat(
'{"name": "Bio #',
LibString.toString(_id),
'", "description": "',
bioText,
'", "image": "data:image/svg+xml;base64,',
Base64.encode(bytes(string.concat(svg, text, "</text></svg>"))),
'"}'
)
)
);
return string(abi.encodePacked("data:application/json;base64,", json));
}OpenCoreCH (Canto Identity) confirmed and commented:
Yeah the line break generally happened approx. after 40 bytes, which results in somewhat weird results for these huge emojis. Should be fixed when the tokenURI is refactored, see
#87.
Low Risk and Non-Critical Issues
For this contest, 38 reports were submitted by wardens detailing low risk and non-critical issues. The report highlighted below by Sathish9098 received the top score from the judge.
The following wardens also submitted reports: joestakey, tnevler, libratus, atharvasama, Kresh, nadin, alejandrocovrr, Aymen0909, 0xdaydream, lukris02, Udsen, Awesome, 0xSmartContract, luxartvinsec, Deathstore, slvDev, cryptonue, 0xAgro, Stryder, Matin, descharre, reassor, IceBear, scokaf, Jerry0x, Diana, igingu, T1MOH, adriro, shark, jack, codeslide, Bauchibred, Rolezn, nasri136, BRONZEDISC, and 0xnev.
[L-01] AVOID USING TX.ORIGIN
tx.origin is a global variable in Solidity that returns the address of the account that sent the transaction.
Using the variable could make a contract vulnerable if an authorized account calls a malicious contract. You can impersonate a user using a third party contract.
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol
63: turnstile.register(tx.origin);FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol
36: turnstile.register(tx.origin);FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol
[L-02] LOSS OF PRECISION DUE TO ROUNDING
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol
49: uint lines = (lengthInBytes - 1) / 40 + 1;FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol
224: uint256 dx = 400 / (_tiles.length + 1);[L-03] Consider using OpenZeppelin’s SafeCast library to prevent unexpected overflows when casting from various type int/uint values
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol
77: uint8(bioTextBytes[i + 4]) >= 187 &&
78: uint8(bioTextBytes[i + 4]) <= 191) ||FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol
163: trayTiledata[j] = _drawing(uint256(lastHash));250 : tileData.characterIndex = uint16(charRandValue % NUM_CHARS_EMOJIS);252: tileData.characterIndex = uint16(charRandValue % NUM_CHARS_LETTERS); tileData.fontClass = 3 + uint8((res - 80) / 8);
} else if (res < 104) {
tileData.fontClass = 5 + uint8((res - 96) / 4);
} else if (res < 108) {
tileData.fontClass = 7 + uint8((res - 104) / 2);267: tileData.characterModifier = uint8(zalgoSeed % 256);FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol
272: uint8 lastByteVal = uint8(_startingSequence[3]);
278: _startingSequence[2] = bytes1(uint8(_startingSequence[2]) + 1);Recommended Mitigation Steps
Consider using OpenZeppelin’s SafeCast library to prevent unexpected overflows when casting from uint256.
[L-04] Prevent division by 0
On several locations in the code precautions are not being taken for not dividing by 0, this will revert the code. These functions can be called with 0 value in the input, this value is not checked for being bigger than 0, that means in some scenarios this can potentially trigger a division by zero
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol
224: uint256 dx = 400 / (_tiles.length + 1);Recommended Mitigation:
Need to check the (_tiles.length + 1) value is not 0
[N-01] Named imports can be used
It’s possible to name the imports to improve code readability.
E.g. import “@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol”; can be rewritten as import {IERC20} from “import “@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol”
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol
import "../interface/Turnstile.sol";
import "../interface/ICidNFT.sol";FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol
import "../interface/Turnstile.sol";FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol
import "./Tray.sol";
import "./Utils.sol";
import "../interface/Turnstile.sol";FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol
import "./Utils.sol";
import "../interface/Turnstile.sol";FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol
4: import "./Tray.sol";Recommendations
import {IERC20} from “import “@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol”
[N-02] AVOID HARDCODED VALUES
It is not good practice to hardcode values, but if you are dealing with addresses much less, these can change between implementations, networks or projects, so it is convenient to remove these values from the source code
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol
62: Turnstile turnstile = Turnstile(0xEcf044C5B4b867CFda001101c617eCd347095B44);60: if (block.chainid == 7700) {FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol
33: if (block.chainid == 7700) {
35: Turnstile turnstile = Turnstile(0xEcf044C5B4b867CFda001101c617eCd347095B44);[N-03] Include return parameters in NatSpec comments
@return tag is missing.
Recommendations
Add @return tag whenever function returns any value.
[N-04] ADD PARAMETER TO EVENT-EMIT
Some event-emit description doesn’t have parameter. Add parameter for front-end website or client app, they can has that something has happened on the blockchain.
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol
80: event PrelaunchEnded();[N-05] NOT USING THE NAMED RETURN VARIABLES ANYWHERE IN THE FUNCTION IS CONFUSING
Consider changing the variable to be an unnamed one.
Tray.sol#L245
Tray.sol#L203
Tray.sol#L195
[N-06] Interchangeable usage of uint and uint256
Context: All Contracts
Consider using only one approach throughout the codebase, e.g. only uint or only uint256
Recommendations
Only uint or only uint256.
[N-07] Immutables should be in uppercase
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol
14: ICidNFT private immutable cidNFT;FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol
17: Tray public immutable tray;FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol
37: uint256 public immutable trayPrice;50: address public immutable namespaceNFT;[N-08] Move IF/validation statements to the top of the function when validating input parameters
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol
function mint(address _nftContract, uint256 _nftID) external {
uint256 tokenId = ++numMinted;
if (ERC721(_nftContract).ownerOf(_nftID) != msg.sender)
revert PFPNotOwnedByCaller(msg.sender, _nftContract, _nftID);
ProfilePictureData storage pictureData = pfp[tokenId];
pictureData.nftContract = _nftContract;[N-09] FOR FUNCTIONS, FOLLOW SOLIDITY STANDARD NAMING CONVENTIONS
Internal and private functions: the mixedCase format starting with an underscore (_mixedCase starting with an underscore)
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol
[N-10] Don’t use numbers without explanation, it’s not a good code practice. It’s possible to use constants.
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol
258: iteratedState = _currState * 15485863;
259: iteratedState = (iteratedState * iteratedState * iteratedState) % 2038074743;[N-11] Use underscores for number literals
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol
258: iteratedState = _currState * 15485863;
259: iteratedState = (iteratedState * iteratedState * iteratedState) % 2038074743;[N-12] NO SAME VALUE INPUT CONTROL
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol
function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentNoteAddress = address(note);
note = ERC20(_newNoteAddress);
emit NoteAddressUpdate(currentNoteAddress, _newNoteAddress);
}
/// @notice Change the revenue address
/// @param _newRevenueAddress New address to use
function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentRevenueAddress = revenueAddress;
revenueAddress = _newRevenueAddress;
emit RevenueAddressUpdated(currentRevenueAddress, _newRevenueAddress);
}[N-13] Need Fuzzing test
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol
257: unchecked {Recommendation
Should use fuzzing test like Echidna.
As Alberto Cuesta Canada said:
“Fuzzing is not easy, the tools are rough, and the math is hard, but it is worth it. Fuzzing gives me a level of confidence in my smart contracts that I didn’t have before. Relying just on unit testing anymore and poking around in a testnet seems reckless now.”
(https://medium.com/coinmonks/smart-contract-fuzzing-d9b88e0b0a05)
[N-14] NatSpec comments should be increased in contracts
Context: All Contracts
Description
It is recommended that Solidity contracts are fully annotated using NatSpec for all public interfaces (everything in the ABI). It is clearly stated in the Solidity official documentation.
In complex projects such as Defi, the interpretation of all functions and their arguments and returns is important for code readability and auditability. (https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.15/natspec-format.html)
[N-15] Function writing that does not comply with the Solidity Style Guide
Context: All Contracts
Description
Order of Functions; ordering helps readers identify which functions they can call and to find the constructor and fallback definitions easier. But there are contracts in the project that do not comply with this.
(https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html)
Functions should be grouped according to their visibility and ordered:
- constructor
- receive function (if exists)
- fallback function (if exists)
- external
- public
- internal
- private
- within a grouping, place the view and pure functions last
[N-16] Add a timelock to critical functions
It is a good practice to give time for users to react and adjust to critical changes. A timelock provides more guarantees and reduces the level of trust required, thus decreasing risk for users. It also indicates that the project is legitimate (less risk of a malicious owner making a sandwich attack on a user). Consider adding a timelock to:
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol
function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentNoteAddress = address(note);
note = ERC20(_newNoteAddress);
emit NoteAddressUpdate(currentNoteAddress, _newNoteAddress);
}
/// @notice Change the revenue address
/// @param _newRevenueAddress New address to use
function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentRevenueAddress = revenueAddress;
revenueAddress = _newRevenueAddress;
emit RevenueAddressUpdated(currentRevenueAddress, _newRevenueAddress);
}FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol
function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentNoteAddress = address(note);
note = ERC20(_newNoteAddress);
emit NoteAddressUpdate(currentNoteAddress, _newNoteAddress);
}
/// @notice Change the revenue address
/// @param _newRevenueAddress New address to use
function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentRevenueAddress = revenueAddress;
revenueAddress = _newRevenueAddress;
emit RevenueAddressUpdated(currentRevenueAddress, _newRevenueAddress);
}
/// @notice End the prelaunch phase and start the public mint
function endPrelaunchPhase() external onlyOwner {
if (prelaunchMinted != type(uint256).max) revert PrelaunchAlreadyEnded();
prelaunchMinted = _nextTokenId() - 1;
emit PrelaunchEnded();
}[N-17] Long lines are not suitable for the ‘Solidity Style Guide’
Bio.sol#L53
Bio.sol#L69
Bio.sol#L98
Namespace.sol#L35
Namespace.sol#L117
Namespace.sol#L126
Namespace.sol#L152
Tray.sol#L247
Utils.sol#L19-L49
Utils.sol#L69-L72
Utils.sol#L140
Utils.sol#L195
Utils.sol#L247
Recommendation
Multiline output parameters and return statements should follow the same style recommended for wrapping long lines found in the Maximum Line Length section.
(https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#introduction)
[N-18] Assembly Codes Specific – Should Have Comments
Since this is a low level language that is more difficult to parse by readers, include extensive documentation, comments on the rationale behind its use, clearly explaining what each assembly instruction does.
This will make it easier for users to trust the code, for reviewers to validate the code, and for developers to build on or update the code.
Note that using Assembly removes several important security features of Solidity, which can make the code more insecure and more error-prone.
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol
87: assembly {FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol
165: assembly {[N-19] Critical changes should use two-step procedure
Lack of two-step procedure for critical operations leaves them error-prone. Consider adding two-step procedure on the critical functions.
Consider adding a two-steps pattern on critical changes to avoid mistakenly transferring ownership of roles or critical functionalities to the wrong address.
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol
function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentNoteAddress = address(note);
note = ERC20(_newNoteAddress);
emit NoteAddressUpdate(currentNoteAddress, _newNoteAddress);
}
/// @notice Change the revenue address
/// @param _newRevenueAddress New address to use
function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentRevenueAddress = revenueAddress;
revenueAddress = _newRevenueAddress;
emit RevenueAddressUpdated(currentRevenueAddress, _newRevenueAddress);
}FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol
function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentNoteAddress = address(note);
note = ERC20(_newNoteAddress);
emit NoteAddressUpdate(currentNoteAddress, _newNoteAddress);
}
/// @notice Change the revenue address
/// @param _newRevenueAddress New address to use
function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
address currentRevenueAddress = revenueAddress;
revenueAddress = _newRevenueAddress;
emit RevenueAddressUpdated(currentRevenueAddress, _newRevenueAddress);
}
/// @notice End the prelaunch phase and start the public mint
function endPrelaunchPhase() external onlyOwner {
if (prelaunchMinted != type(uint256).max) revert PrelaunchAlreadyEnded();
prelaunchMinted = _nextTokenId() - 1;
emit PrelaunchEnded();
}[N-20] Missing NATSPEC
FILE : 2023-03-canto-identity/canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol
ProfilePicture.sol#L40-L45
ProfilePicture.sol#L50-L52
Bio.sol#L23
Namespace.sol#L54-L67
Tray.sol#L78-L90
[N-21] Imports can be grouped together
Group solmate/utils imports
import {ERC721A} from "erc721a/ERC721A.sol";
import {ERC20} from "solmate/tokens/ERC20.sol";
import {SafeTransferLib} from "solmate/utils/SafeTransferLib.sol";
import {Owned} from "solmate/auth/Owned.sol";
import {LibString} from "solmate/utils/LibString.sol";
import {Base64} from "solady/utils/Base64.sol";
import "./Utils.sol";
import "../interface/Turnstile.sol";[S-01] Project Upgrade and Stop Scenario should be
Suggestion
At the start of the project, the system may need to be stopped or upgraded, I suggest you have a script beforehand and add it to the documentation. This can also be called an ” EMERGENCY STOP (CIRCUIT BREAKER) PATTERN “.
(https://github.com/maxwoe/solidity_patterns/blob/master/security/EmergencyStop.sol)
Gas Optimizations
For this contest, 41 reports were submitted by wardens detailing gas optimizations. The report highlighted below by 0xSmartContract received the top score from the judge.
The following wardens also submitted reports: Kresh, anodaram, viking71, Aymen0909, lukris02, nadin, 0xdaydream, Udsen, Shubham, tnevler, EvanW, slvDev, atharvasama, Walter, Deekshith99, turvy_fuzz, descharre, Jerry0x, SAAJ, JCN, Diana, igingu, Fanz, MiniGlome, codeslide, felipe, Viktor_Cortess, Rolezn, caspersolangii, 0xnev, ReyAdmirado, Rageur, Polaris_tow, fatherOfBlocks, SaeedAlipoor01988, ginlee, Sathish9098, arialblack14, K42, and Madalad.
Summary
| Number | Optimization Details | Context |
|---|---|---|
| [G-01] | Gas overflow during iteration (DoS) | 2 |
| [G-02] | State variables only set in the constructor should be declared immutable | 1 |
| [G-03] | Failure to check the zero address in the constructor causes the contract to be deployed again | 3 |
| [G-04] | By updating emit, extra emit usage can be reduced |
1 |
| [G-05] | Emit can be rearranged | 4 |
| [G-06] | Use assembly to write address storage values |
2 |
| [G-07] | Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be marked payable |
6 |
| [G-08] | Multiple address/ID mappings can be combined into a single mapping of an address/ID to a struct, where appropriate |
2 |
| [G-09] | Use a more recent version of solidity | 5 |
| [G-10] | The result of function calls should be cached rather than re-calling the function | 1 |
| [G-11] | Avoid contract existence checks by using low level calls | 11 |
| [G-12] | bytes constants are more eficient than string constans |
1 |
| [G-13] | Change public function visibility to external |
3 |
| [G-14] | Usage of uints/ints smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead | 15 |
| [G-15] | Setting the constructor to payable |
4 |
| [G-16] | Use nested if and, avoid multiple check combinations | 7 |
| [G-17] | Sort Solidity operations using short-circuit mode | 4 |
| [G-18] | Use ERC721A instead ERC721 | |
| [G-19] | Optimize names to save gas | All Contract |
| [G-20] | Upgrade Solidity’s optimizer | 3 |
[G-01] Gas overflow during iteration (DoS)
Each iteration of the cycle requires a gas flow. A moment may come when more gas is required than it is allocated to record one block. In this case, all iterations of the loop will fail.
2 results - 2 files:
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
109 /// @param _characterList The tiles to use for the fusing
110: function fuse(CharacterData[] calldata _characterList) external {
+ require(_characterList.length < max _characterListLengt, "max length");
111: uint256 numCharacters = _characterList.length;
112: if (numCharacters > 13 || numCharacters == 0) revert InvalidNumberOfCharacters(numCharacters);
113: uint256 fusingCosts = 2**(13 - numCharacters) * 1e18;
114: SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(note, msg.sender, revenueAddress, fusingCosts);
115: uint256 namespaceIDToMint = ++nextNamespaceIDToMint;
116: Tray.TileData[] storage nftToMintCharacters = nftCharacters[namespaceIDToMint];
117: bytes memory bName = new bytes(numCharacters * 33); // Used to convert into a string. Can be 33 times longer than the string at most (longest zalgo characters is 33 bytes)
118: uint256 numBytes;
119: // Extract unique trays for burning them later on
120: uint256 numUniqueTrays;
121: uint256[] memory uniqueTrays = new uint256[](_characterList.length);
122: for (uint256 i; i < numCharacters; ++i) {
123: bool isLastTrayEntry = true;
124: uint256 trayID = _characterList[i].trayID;
125: uint8 tileOffset = _characterList[i].tileOffset;
126: // Check for duplicate characters in the provided list. 1/2 * n^2 loop iterations, but n is bounded to 13 and we do not perform any storage operationscanto-namespace-protocol\src\Utils.sol:
222: function generateSVG(Tray.TileData[] memory _tiles, bool _isTray) internal pure returns (string memory) {
+ require(_tiles.length < max _tilesLengt, "max length");
223: string memory innerData;
224: uint256 dx = 400 / (_tiles.length + 1);
225: for (uint256 i; i < _tiles.length; ++i) {
226: innerData = string.concat(
227: innerData,
228: '<text dominant-baseline="middle" text-anchor="middle" y="100" x="',
229: LibString.toString(dx * (i + 1)),
230: '">',
231: string(
232: characterToUnicodeBytes(_tiles[i].fontClass, _tiles[i].characterIndex, _tiles[i].characterModifier)
233: ),
234: "</text>"
235: );
236: if (_isTray) {
237: innerData = string.concat(
238: innerData,
239: '<rect width="34" height="60" y="70" x="',
240: LibString.toString(dx * (i + 1) - 17),
241: '" stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none"></rect>'
242: );
243: }
244: }
245: return
246: string.concat(
247: '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" preserveAspectRatio="xMinYMin meet" viewBox="0 0 400 200"><style>text { font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 30px; }</style>',
248: innerData,
249: "</svg>"
250: );
251: }Here are the data available in the covered contracts. The use of this situation in contracts that are not covered will also provide gas optimization.
[G-02] State variables only set in the constructor should be declared immutable
Avoids a Gsset (20000 gas) in the constructor and replaces the first access in each transaction (Gcoldsload - 2100 gas) and each access thereafter (Gwarmacces - 100 gas) with a PUSH32 (3 gas).
canto-pfp-protocol\src\ProfilePicture.sol:
35: string public subprotocolName;[G-03] Failure to check the zero address in the constructor causes the contract to be deployed again
Zero address control is not performed in the constructor in all 3 contracts within the scope of the audit. Bypassing this check could cause the contract to be deployed by mistakenly entering a zero address. In this case, the contract will need to be redeployed. This means extra gas consumption as contract deployment costs are high.
3 results - 3 files:
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
73: constructor(
74: address _tray,
75: address _note,
76: address _revenueAddress
77: ) ERC721("Namespace", "NS") Owned(msg.sender) {
78: tray = Tray(_tray);
79: note = ERC20(_note);
80: revenueAddress = _revenueAddress;
81: if (block.chainid == 7700) {
82: // Register CSR on Canto mainnnet
83: Turnstile turnstile = Turnstile(0xEcf044C5B4b867CFda001101c617eCd347095B44);
84: turnstile.register(tx.origin);
85: }
86: }canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
97 /// @param _namespaceNFT Address of the Namespace NFT
98: constructor(
99: bytes32 _initHash,
100: uint256 _trayPrice,
101: address _revenueAddress,
102: address _note,
103: address _namespaceNFT
104: ) ERC721A("Namespace Tray", "NSTRAY") Owned(msg.sender) {
105: lastHash = _initHash;
106: trayPrice = _trayPrice;
107: revenueAddress = _revenueAddress;
108: note = ERC20(_note);
109: namespaceNFT = _namespaceNFT;
110: if (block.chainid == 7700) {
111: // Register CSR on Canto mainnnet
112: Turnstile turnstile = Turnstile(0xEcf044C5B4b867CFda001101c617eCd347095B44);
113: turnstile.register(tx.origin);
114: }
115: }canto-pfp-protocol\src\ProfilePicture.sol:
56 /// @param _subprotocolName Name with which the subprotocol is / will be registered in the registry. Registration will not be performed automatically
57: constructor(address _cidNFT, string memory _subprotocolName) ERC721("Profile Picture", "PFP") {
58: cidNFT = ICidNFT(_cidNFT);
59: subprotocolName = _subprotocolName;
60: if (block.chainid == 7700) {
61: // Register CSR on Canto mainnnet
62: Turnstile turnstile = Turnstile(0xEcf044C5B4b867CFda001101c617eCd347095B44);
63: turnstile.register(tx.origin);
64: }
65: }[G-04] By updating emit, extra emit usage can be reduced
In the mint function in the Bio.sol contract, the protocol emits two emits (the _mint and bioAdded emits). By updating the emit of Solady’s _mint function, the use of one extra emit can be reduced.
Reference: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/blob/master/params/protocol_params.go#L78-L82
canto-bio-protocol/lib/solady/lib/solmate/src/tokens/ERC721.sol:
+ event Transfer(address from, address indexed to, uint256 indexed id, string indexed bio);
+ 157: function _mint(address to, uint256 id) internal virtual {
+ 158: require(to != address(0), "INVALID_RECIPIENT");
+ 159:
+ 160: require(_ownerOf[id] == address(0), "ALREADY_MINTED");
+ 161:
+ 162: // Counter overflow is incredibly unrealistic.
+ 163: unchecked {
+ 164: _balanceOf[to]++;
+ 165: }
+ 166:
+ 167: _ownerOf[id] = to;
+ 168:
+ 169: emit Transfer(address(0), to, tokenId, _bio );
+ 170: }
canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol:
23: event BioAdded(address indexed minter, uint256 indexed nftID, string indexed bio);
120 /// @param _bio The text to add
121: function mint(string calldata _bio) external {
122: // We check the length in bytes, so will be higher for UTF-8 characters. But sufficient for this check
123: if (bytes(_bio).length == 0 || bytes(_bio).length > 200) revert InvalidBioLength(bytes(_bio).length);
124: uint256 tokenId = ++numMinted;
125: bio[tokenId] = _bio;
- 126: _mint(msg.sender, tokenId,);
+ 126: _mint(msg.sender, tokenId, _bio);
- 127: emit BioAdded(msg.sender, tokenId, _bio);
128: }[G-05] Emit can be rearranged
The emit can be rearranged in the changeNoteAddress() and changeRevenueAddress() functions. With this arrangement, both the deploy time (~1.4 k * 4 = 5.6k gas per function) and every time the functions are triggered (~16 gas) gas savings will be achieved.
4 results - 2 files:
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
209 /// @param _newNoteAddress New address to use
210: function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
211: address currentNoteAddress = address(note);
212: note = ERC20(_newNoteAddress);
213: emit NoteAddressUpdate(currentNoteAddress, _newNoteAddress);
214: }
217 /// @param _newRevenueAddress New address to use
218: function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
219: address currentRevenueAddress = revenueAddress;
220: revenueAddress = _newRevenueAddress;
221: emit RevenueAddressUpdated(currentRevenueAddress, _newRevenueAddress);
222: }canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
195 /// @param _newNoteAddress New address to use
196: function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
197: address currentNoteAddress = address(note);
198: note = ERC20(_newNoteAddress);
199: emit NoteAddressUpdate(currentNoteAddress, _newNoteAddress);
200: }
203 /// @param _newRevenueAddress New address to use
204: function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
205: address currentRevenueAddress = revenueAddress;
206: revenueAddress = _newRevenueAddress;
207: emit RevenueAddressUpdated(currentRevenueAddress, _newRevenueAddress);
208: }
209 }canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
195 /// @param _newNoteAddress New address to use
196: function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
- 197: address currentNoteAddress = address(note);
- 198: note = ERC20(_newNoteAddress);
- 199: emit NoteAddressUpdate(currentNoteAddress, _newNoteAddress);
+ 199: emit NoteAddressUpdate(note, _newNoteAddress);
+ 198: note = ERC20(_newNoteAddress);
200: }[G-06] Use assembly to write address storage values
2 results - 4 files:
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
73: constructor(
80: revenueAddress = _revenueAddress;
204: function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
206: revenueAddress = _newRevenueAddress;canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
98: constructor(
107: revenueAddress = _revenueAddress;
218: function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
220: revenueAddress = _newRevenueAddress;Recommendation Code
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
98: constructor(
- 107: revenueAddress = _revenueAddress;
+ assembly {
+ sstore(vault. revenueAddress, _revenueAddress)
+ }
[G-07] Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be marked payable
If a function modifier such as onlyOwner is used, the function will revert if a normal user tries to pay the function. Marking the function as payable will lower the gas cost for legitimate callers because the compiler will not include checks for whether a payment was provided.
6 results - 2 files:
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
196: function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
204: function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
210: function changeNoteAddress(address _newNoteAddress) external onlyOwner {
218: function changeRevenueAddress(address _newRevenueAddress) external onlyOwner {
225: function endPrelaunchPhase() external onlyOwner {[G-08] Multiple address/ID mappings can be combined into a single mapping of an address/ID to a struct, where appropriate
Saves a storage slot for the mapping. Depending on the circumstances and sizes of types, can avoid a Gsset (20000 gas) per mapping combined. Reads and subsequent writes can also be cheaper when a function requires both values and they both fit in the same storage slot. Finally, if both fields are accessed in the same function, can save ~42 gas per access due to not having to recalculate the key’s keccak256 hash (Gkeccak256 - 30 gas) and that calculation’s associated stack operations.
2 results - 1 file:
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
43: mapping(string => uint256) public nameToToken;
46: mapping(uint256 => string) public tokenToName;[G-09] Use a more recent version of solidity
- Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.0 to get overflow protection without SafeMath
- Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.2 to get simple compiler automatic inlining
- Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.3 to get better struct packing and cheaper multiple storage reads
- Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.4 to get custom errors, which are cheaper at deployment than revert()/require() strings
- Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.10 to have external calls skip contract existence checks if the external call has a return value
- In 0.8.15 the conditions necessary for inlining are relaxed. Benchmarks show that the change significantly decreases the bytecode size (which impacts the deployment cost) while the effect on the runtime gas usage is smaller.
- In 0.8.17 prevent the incorrect removal of storage writes before calls to Yul functions that conditionally terminate the external EVM call; Simplify the starting offset of zero-length operations to zero. More efficient overflow checks for multiplication.
5 results - 5 files:
canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol:
2: pragma solidity >=0.8.0;https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/main/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L2
canto-namespace-protocol/src/Namespace.sol:
2: pragma solidity >=0.8.0;canto-namespace-protocol/src/Tray.sol:
2: pragma solidity >=0.8.0;canto-namespace-protocol/src/Utils.sol:
2: pragma solidity >=0.8.0;canto-pfp-protocol/src/ProfilePicture.sol:
2: pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
[G-10] The result of function calls should be cached rather than re-calling the function
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
245: function _drawing(uint256 _seed) private pure returns (TileData memory tileData) {
247: uint256 charRandValue = Utils.iteratePRNG(_seed); // Iterate PRNG to not have any biasedness / correlation between random numbers
265: // Set seed for Zalgo to ensure same characters will be always generated for this tile
- 266: uint256 zalgoSeed = Utils.iteratePRNG(_seed);
+ 266: uint256 zalgoSeed = charRandValue;
267: tileData.characterModifier = uint8(zalgoSeed % 256);
268 }[G-11] Avoid contract existence checks by using low level calls
Prior to 0.8.10 the compiler inserted extra code, including EXTCODESIZE (100 gas), to check for contract existence for external function calls. In more recent solidity versions, the compiler will not insert these checks if the external call has a return value. Similar behavior can be achieved in earlier versions by using low-level calls, since low level calls never check for contract existence.
12 results - 4 files:
canto-bio-protocol\src\Bio.sol:
// @audit register()
36: turnstile.register(tx.origin);https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/main/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L36
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
// @audit register()
84: turnstile.register(tx.origin);
// @audit getTile()
133: Tray.TileData memory tileData = tray.getTile(trayID, tileOffset); // Will revert if tileOffset is too high
// @audit ownerOf()
156: address trayOwner = tray.ownerOf(trayID);
// @audit getApproved()
159: tray.getApproved(trayID) != msg.sender &&
// @audit isApprovedForAll()
160: !tray.isApprovedForAll(trayOwner, msg.sender)canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
// @audit register()
113: turnstile.register(tx.origin);canto-pfp-protocol\src\ProfilePicture.sol:
// @audit register()
63: turnstile.register(tx.origin);
// @audit tokenURI()
73: return ERC721(nftContract).tokenURI(nftID);
// @audit ownerOf()
81: if (ERC721(_nftContract).ownerOf(_nftID) != msg.sender)
// @audit addressRegistry()
100: IAddressRegistry addressRegistry = cidNFT.addressRegistry();
// @audit getAddress(), ownerOf()
101: if (cidNFTID == 0 || addressRegistry.getAddress(cidNFTID) != ERC721(nftContract).ownerOf(nftID)) {[G-12] bytes constants are more eficient than string constans
If the data can fit in 32 bytes, the bytes32 data type can be used instead of bytes or strings, as it is less robust in terms of robustness.
canto-pfp-protocol\src\ProfilePicture.sol:
35: string public subprotocolName;[G-13] Change public function visibility to external
Since the following public functions are not called from within the contract, their visibility can be made external for gas optimization.
3 results - 3 files:
canto-bio-protocol\src\Bio.sol:
43: function tokenURI(uint256 _id) public view override returns (string memory) {https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/main/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L43
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
90: function tokenURI(uint256 _id) public view override returns (string memory) {canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
119: function tokenURI(uint256 _id) public view override returns (string memory) {[G-14] Usage of uints/ints smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead
When using elements that are smaller than 32 bytes, your contracts gas usage may be higher. This is because the EVM operates on 32 bytes at a time. Therefore, if the element is smaller than that, the EVM must use more operations in order to reduce the size of the element from 32 bytes to the desired size.
https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.11/internals/layout_in_storage.html
Use a larger size then downcast where needed.
15 result - 2 files:
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
// @audit uint8 fontClass
259: tileData.fontClass = 3 + uint8((res - 80) / 8);
261: tileData.fontClass = 5 + uint8((res - 96) / 4);
263: tileData.fontClass = 7 + uint8((res - 104) / 2);
// @audit uint8 characterModifier
267: tileData.characterModifier = uint8(zalgoSeed % 256);canto-namespace-protocol\src\Utils.sol:
// @audit uint16 _characterIndex
85: byteOffset = _characterIndex * 3;
86: supportsSkinToneModifier = _characterIndex >= EMOJIS_LE_THREE_BYTES - EMOJIS_MOD_SKIN_TONE_THREE_BYTES;
89: byteOffset = EMOJIS_BYTE_OFFSET_FOUR_BYTES + (_characterIndex - EMOJIS_LE_THREE_BYTES) * 4;
93: byteOffset = EMOJIS_BYTE_OFFSET_SIX_BYTES + (_characterIndex - EMOJIS_LE_FOUR_BYTES) * 6;
96: byteOffset = EMOJIS_BYTE_OFFSET_SEVEN_BYTES + (_characterIndex - EMOJIS_LE_SIX_BYTES) * 7;
99: byteOffset = EMOJIS_BYTE_OFFSET_EIGHT_BYTES + (_characterIndex - EMOJIS_LE_SEVEN_BYTES) * 8;
102: byteOffset = EMOJIS_BYTE_OFFSET_FOURTEEN_BYTES + (_characterIndex - EMOJIS_LE_EIGHT_BYTES) * 14;
// @audit uint8 asciiStartingIndex
135: return abi.encodePacked(bytes1(asciiStartingIndex + uint8(_characterIndex)));
// @audit uint8 asciiStartingIndex, _characterIndex
145: bytes memory character = abi.encodePacked(bytes1(asciiStartingIndex + uint8(_characterIndex)));
273: uint8 lastByteSum = lastByteVal + _characterIndex;
277: lastByteVal = 128 + (lastByteSum % 192);[G-15] Setting the constructor to payable
You can cut out 10 opcodes in the creation-time EVM bytecode if you declare a constructor payable. Making the constructor payable eliminates the need for an initial check of msg.value == 0 and saves 13 gas on deployment with no security risks.
4 results - 4 files:
canto-bio-protocol\src\Bio.sol:
32: constructor() ERC721("Biography", "Bio") {https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/main/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L32
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
73: constructor(canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
98: constructor(canto-pfp-protocol\src\ProfilePicture.sol:
57: constructor(address _cidNFT, string memory _subprotocolName) ERC721("Profile Picture", "PFP") {Recommendation
Set the constructor to payable
[G-16] Use nested if and, avoid multiple check combinations
Using nested is cheaper than using && multiple check combinations. There are more advantages, such as easier to read code and better coverage reports.
7 results - 3 files:
canto-bio-protocol\src\Bio.sol:
60: if ((i > 0 && (i + 1) % 40 == 0) || prevByteWasContinuation || i == lengthInBytes - 1) {
65: if (nextCharacter & 0xC0 == 0x80) {https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/main/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L60
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
136: if (tileData.fontClass != 0 && _characterList[i].skinToneModifier != 0) {
157: if (
158: trayOwner != msg.sender &&
159: tray.getApproved(trayID) != msg.sender &&
160: !tray.isApprovedForAll(trayOwner, msg.sender)
161: ) revert CallerNotAllowedToFuse();
186: if (nftOwner != msg.sender && getApproved[_id] != msg.sender && !isApprovedForAll[nftOwner][msg.sender])canto-namespace-protocol\src\Tray.sol:
175: if (
176: namespaceNFT != msg.sender &&
177: trayOwner != msg.sender &&
178: getApproved(_id) != msg.sender &&
179: !isApprovedForAll(trayOwner, msg.sender)
180: ) revert CallerNotAllowedToBurn();
184: if (numPrelaunchMinted != type(uint256).max && _id <= numPrelaunchMinted)[G-17] Sort Solidity operations using short-circuit mode
Short-circuiting is a solidity contract development model that uses OR/AND logic to sequence different cost operations. It puts low gas cost operations in the front and high gas cost operations in the back, so that if the front is low If the cost operation is feasible, you can skip (short-circuit) the subsequent high-cost Ethereum virtual machine operation.
//f(x) is a low gas cost operation
//g(y) is a high gas cost operation
//Sort operations with different gas costs as follows
f(x) || g(y)
f(x) && g(y)4 results - 3 files:
canto-bio-protocol\src\Bio.sol:
60: if ((i > 0 && (i + 1) % 40 == 0) || prevByteWasContinuation || i == lengthInBytes - 1) {
123: if (bytes(_bio).length == 0 || bytes(_bio).length > 200) revert InvalidBioLength(bytes(_bio).length);https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-canto-identity/blob/main/canto-bio-protocol/src/Bio.sol#L60
canto-namespace-protocol\src\Namespace.sol:
112: if (numCharacters > 13 || numCharacters == 0) revert InvalidNumberOfCharacters(numCharacters);canto-pfp-protocol\src\ProfilePicture.sol:
101: if (cidNFTID == 0 || addressRegistry.getAddress(cidNFTID) != ERC721(nftContract).ownerOf(nftID)) {[G-18] Use ERC721A instead ERC721
ERC721A standard, ERC721A is an improvement standard for ERC721 tokens. It was proposed by the Azuki team and used for developing their NFT collection. Compared with ERC721, ERC721A is a more gas-efficient standard to mint a lot of of NFTs simultaneously. It allows developers to mint multiple NFTs at the same gas price. This has been a great improvement due to Ethereum’s sky-rocketing gas fee.
Reference: https://nextrope.com/erc721-vs-erc721a-2/
[G-19] Optimize names to save gas
Contracts most called functions could simply save gas by function ordering via Method ID. Calling a function at runtime will be cheaper if the function is positioned earlier in the order (has a relatively lower Method ID) because 22 gas are added to the cost of a function for every position that came before it. The caller can save on gas if you prioritize most called functions.
Context: All Contracts
Recommendation
Find a lower method ID name for the most called functions for example Call() vs. Call1() is cheaper by 22 gas.
For example, the function IDs in the Namespace.sol contract will be the most used; A lower method ID may be given.
Proof of Concept
Namespace.sol function names can be named and sorted according to METHOD ID
Sighash | Function Signature
========================
c87b56dd => tokenURI(uint256)
11f839e2 => fuse(CharacterData[])
42966c68 => burn(uint256)
21496de6 => changeNoteAddress(address)
92f8b9a3 => changeRevenueAddress(address)[G-20] Upgrade Solidity’s optimizer
Make sure Solidity’s optimizer is enabled. It reduces gas costs. If you want to gas optimize for contract deployment (costs less to deploy a contract) then set the Solidity optimizer at a low number. If you want to optimize for run-time gas costs (when functions are called on a contract) then set the optimizer to a high number.
3 results - 3 files:
canto-bio-protocol\foundry.toml:
2: optimizer = true
3: optimizer_runs = 1_000canto-namespace-protocol\foundry.toml:
2: optimizer = true
3: optimizer_runs = 1_000canto-pfp-protocol\foundry.toml:
2: optimizer = true
3: optimizer_runs = 1_000Disclosures
C4 is an open organization governed by participants in the community.
C4 Contests incentivize the discovery of exploits, vulnerabilities, and bugs in smart contracts. Security researchers are rewarded at an increasing rate for finding higher-risk issues. Contest submissions are judged by a knowledgeable security researcher and solidity developer and disclosed to sponsoring developers. C4 does not conduct formal verification regarding the provided code but instead provides final verification.
C4 does not provide any guarantee or warranty regarding the security of this project. All smart contract software should be used at the sole risk and responsibility of users.