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Ondo Finance
Findings & Analysis Report

2023-10-12

Table of contents

Overview

About C4

Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers, and individuals with domain expertise in smart contracts.

A C4 audit is an event in which community participants, referred to as Wardens, review, audit, or analyze smart contract logic in exchange for a bounty provided by sponsoring projects.

During the audit outlined in this document, C4 conducted an analysis of the Ondo Finance smart contract system written in Solidity. The audit took place between September 1 — September 7, 2023.

Wardens

71 Wardens contributed reports to the Ondo Finance:

  1. adriro
  2. gkrastenov
  3. lsaudit
  4. 0xpiken
  5. nirlin
  6. ast3ros
  7. ladboy233
  8. pontifex
  9. 0xAsen
  10. 0xStalin
  11. Inspecktor
  12. Arz
  13. BenRai
  14. merlin
  15. Delvir0
  16. Udsen
  17. kaveyjoe
  18. kutugu
  19. bin2chen
  20. pep7siup
  21. 0xDING99YA
  22. SpicyMeatball
  23. bowtiedvirus
  24. catellatech
  25. hunter_w3b
  26. JayShreeRAM
  27. DedOhWale
  28. c3phas
  29. seerether
  30. K42
  31. castle_chain
  32. naman1778
  33. 0xmystery
  34. matrix_0wl
  35. Breeje
  36. peanuts
  37. sandy
  38. hals
  39. m4ttm
  40. mahdikarimi
  41. Bube
  42. Krace
  43. 0xE1D
  44. MohammedRizwan
  45. wahedtalash77
  46. petrichor
  47. zabihullahazadzoi
  48. SY_S
  49. SAQ
  50. SAAJ
  51. 0xhex
  52. 0xta
  53. jeffy
  54. 0x11singh99
  55. albahaca
  56. Eurovickk
  57. ybansal2403
  58. Raihan
  59. klau5
  60. dev0cloo
  61. Aymen0909
  62. Lalanda
  63. SovaSlava
  64. ohm (0xkmr and 0x4ka5h)
  65. 0xpanicError
  66. codegpt
  67. 0x6980
  68. Stormreckson
  69. pipidu83
  70. 0xanmol

This audit was judged by kirk-baird.

Final report assembled by thebrittfactor.

Summary

The C4 analysis yielded an aggregated total of 4 unique vulnerabilities, all with a risk rating in the category of MEDIUM severity.

Additionally, C4 analysis included 34 reports detailing issues with a risk rating of LOW severity or non-critical. There were also 21 reports recommending gas optimizations.

All of the issues presented here are linked back to their original finding.

Scope

The code under review can be found within the C4 Ondo Finance repository, and is composed of 6 smart contracts written in the Solidity programming language and includes 962 lines of Solidity code.

In addition to the known issues identified by the project team, a Code4rena bot race was conducted at the start of the audit. The winning bot, henry from warden hihen, generated the Automated Findings report and all findings therein were classified as out of scope.

Severity Criteria

C4 assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities based on three primary risk categories: high, medium, and low/non-critical.

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

  • Malicious Input Handling
  • Escalation of privileges
  • Arithmetic
  • Gas use

For more information regarding the severity criteria referenced throughout the submission review process, please refer to the documentation provided on the C4 website, specifically our section on Severity Categorization.

Medium Risk Findings (4)

[M-01] Chain support cannot be removed or cleared in bridge contracts

Submitted by adriro, also found by gkrastenov and lsaudit

Due to how addresses are handled and stored in the configuration settings, it is not possible to remove chain support in both source and destination bridge contracts.

The Axelar bridge service uses strings to represent addresses: messages sent to another chain need to specify its destination contract as a string. The protocol decided to follow the same representation and contract store addresses as strings as part of their configuration.

Chain support in the bridge contracts is then represented by associating the chain name with the address of the contract, stored as a string. This can be seen in the implementation of setDestinationChainContractAddress() for the SourceBridge contract, which stores the string, and the implementation of addChainSupport() in the DestinationBridge contract, which stores the hash of the string:

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol#L121-L129

121:   function setDestinationChainContractAddress(
122:     string memory destinationChain,
123:     address contractAddress
124:   ) external onlyOwner {
125:     destChainToContractAddr[destinationChain] = AddressToString.toString(
126:       contractAddress
127:     );
128:     emit DestinationChainContractAddressSet(destinationChain, contractAddress);
129:   }

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L234-L240

234:   function addChainSupport(
235:     string calldata srcChain,
236:     string calldata srcContractAddress
237:   ) external onlyOwner {
238:     chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] = keccak256(abi.encode(srcContractAddress));
239:     emit ChainIdSupported(srcChain, srcContractAddress);
240:   }

This also means that checks need to be done based on the stored representation. SourceBridge checks the length of the string, while DestinationBridge checks for a bytes32(0) value:

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol#L68-L71

68:     if (bytes(destContract).length == 0) {
69:       revert DestinationNotSupported();
70:     }
71: 

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L96-L98

96:     if (chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] == bytes32(0)) {
97:       revert ChainNotSupported();
98:     }

Note that this implies that there is no way to clear these settings and remove chain support. In the case of SourceBridge, any address sent to setDestinationChainContractAddress() will be converted to their string representation, which will always have a length greater than zero. For the DestinationBridge, addChainSupport() will hash the address parameter and it will be impossible for that hash value to be zero (since it will imply knowing the preimage of zero).

Proof of Concept

  1. Admin configs the destination address in SourceBridge by calling setDestinationChainContractAddress("optimism", destinationAddress).
  2. Admin decides to remove support for Optimism.
  3. Admin calls setDestinationChainContractAddress("optimism", address(0)), but this will actually store the string for the zero address 0x0000....000.
  4. The check bytes(destContract).length == 0 will fail and messages will still be routed.

Provide functions in both contracts to allow the owner to clear the settings by resetting their configuration to the default value.

function removeDestinationChainContractAddress(
  string memory destinationChain
) external onlyOwner {
  delete destChainToContractAddr[destinationChain];
  emit DestinationChainContractAddressRemoved(destinationChain);
}
function removeChainSupport(
  string calldata srcChain
) external onlyOwner {
  delete chainToApprovedSender[srcChain];
  emit ChainIdRemoved(srcChain);
}

tom2o17 (Ondo) commented:

@kirk-baird - Can I not set acceptable srcAddr to address(0) and then, given address(0) cannot have a contract deployed to it, this value should not be within the possible ranges of srcAddr within the _execute function?

Granted not super ideal given it will hit a different error message, but functionally, the result is the same.

kirk-baird (judge) commented:

@tom2o17 - My concern here is that there’s no way to stop calling burnAndCallAxelar(), which would burn tokens on the source chain. These would not be minted on the destination chain and are essentially lost.

E.g. If you call setDestinationChainContractAddress(dstChain, address(0)), then Address.toString(address(0)) will encode that to 42 hex characters.

So this check in burnAndCallAxelar() will always pass, since bytes(destContract).length is 42 bytes.

tom2o17 (Ondo) commented:

@kirk-baird - Ah I see. I am inclined to accept this issue. Apologies, I thought this was referencing the dstBridge not the srcBridge. As mitigation we would be able to pause the contract, and prevent this functionality, but agree with the auditor that this is not ideal.

tom2o17 (Ondo) acknowledged


[M-02] All bridged funds will be lost for the users using the account abstraction wallet

Submitted by nirlin, also found by pontifex, ladboy233, ast3ros, and 0xpiken

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol#L61-L82
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L85-L114

Impact

Users with account abstraction wallets have a different address across different chains for same account, so if someone using an account abstraction wallet bridge the asset, assets will be minted to wrong address and lost permanently.

Proof of Concept

Account abstraction wallets have been on the rise for quite a time now and have a lot of users. See the below image for the figures by safe wallet (one of the account abstraction wallets):

https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/135237830/273336415-ecc7eef9-1e00-49b4-b48b-5030d62a372b.png

With 4.4 million users and 5.4 billion assets, there is very high risk that safe wallet users will try to bridge the assets and loose them.

Now, look at the codebase and understand how the assets will be lost.

In source bridge in burnAndCallAxelar we construct the payload as follow :

Here, we can see the payload passes msg.sender as receiving an address on the other chain, assuming that the user has the same address across all the EVM chains; which is not the case if user is using the account abstraction wallet.

    bytes memory payload = abi.encode(VERSION, msg.sender, amount, nonce++);

Then, it calls the following function passing the payload, which then calls the callContract function passing the payload to Axelar Network.

  function _payGasAndCallCotract(
    string calldata destinationChain,
    string memory destContract,
    bytes memory payload
  ) private {
    GAS_RECEIVER.payNativeGasForContractCall{value: msg.value}(
      address(this),
      destinationChain,
      destContract,
      payload,
      msg.sender
    );

    // Send all information to AxelarGateway contract.
    AXELAR_GATEWAY.callContract(destinationChain, destContract, payload);
  }

Then, on the destination, any Axelar node can call the execute() function, passing in the payload. The tokens will be minted to an account abstraction wallet address of the source chain, but on destination, the same person will not be the owner of that address; hence, tokens are permanently lost.

  function _execute(
    string calldata srcChain,
    string calldata srcAddr,
    bytes calldata payload
  ) internal override whenNotPaused {
  
    (bytes32 version, address srcSender, uint256 amt, uint256 nonce) = abi
      .decode(payload, (bytes32, address, uint256, uint256));

    if (version != VERSION) {
      revert InvalidVersion();
    }
    if (chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] == bytes32(0)) {
      revert ChainNotSupported();
    }
    // each chain have only one approved sender that is the source bridge contract.
    if (chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] != keccak256(abi.encode(srcAddr))) {
      revert SourceNotSupported();
    }
    if (isSpentNonce[chainToApprovedSender[srcChain]][nonce]) {
      revert NonceSpent();
    }

    isSpentNonce[chainToApprovedSender[srcChain]][nonce] = true;

    // same payload would have the same txhash
    bytes32 txnHash = keccak256(payload);
    txnHashToTransaction[txnHash] = Transaction(srcSender, amt);
    _attachThreshold(amt, txnHash, srcChain);
    _approve(txnHash);
    _mintIfThresholdMet(txnHash);
    emit MessageReceived(srcChain, srcSender, amt, nonce);
  }

Give the user the option to pass in the address the tokens should be minted to on the destination bridge. Pass in the warning for account abstraction wallet holders to not to pass the same wallet. Some wallets may follow a deterministic deployment approach to have same address, but as safe explains, that grants nothing, as each chain has its own different state and opcode differences; so even a deterministic approach may generate different addresses.

Assessed type

Invalid Validation

tom2o17 (Ondo) acknowledged, but disagreed with severity

kirk-baird (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:

Downgrading this to medium severity as users would know ahead of time that the receiving address is the same as the sending address.


[M-03] Two different transactions can result in the same txnHash value, thus breaking the approval process of transaction minting

Submitted by Udsen, also found by adriro, pep7siup, kutugu, ast3ros, bin2chen, 0xDING99YA, SpicyMeatball, 0xpiken (1, 2), bowtiedvirus, Inspecktor, and seerether

The DestinationBridge._execute is an internal function that is executed when contract is called by Axelar Gateway. The _execute function stores the Transaction struct in the txnHashToTransaction mapping as shown below:

bytes32 txnHash = keccak256(payload);
txnHashToTransaction[txnHash] = Transaction(srcSender, amt); 

The transaction hash txnHash is calculated by keccak256(payload) and the payload is an abi encoded value consisting of following variables.

bytes32 version, address srcSender, uint256 amt, uint256 nonce

The issue here is that the two different srcChains with two different srcAddr contracts can end up providing the same txnHash if the above mentioned version, srcSender, amt and nonce are the same. The _execute function only restricts the same srcAddr to not to use the same nonce as shown below:

if (isSpentNonce[chainToApprovedSender[srcChain]][nonce]) {
  revert NonceSpent();
}

But the problem is if there are different srcAddrs providing the same payload it will result into the same txnHash.

Hence, there could be two transactions with the same transaction hash (txnHash). The later transaction will override the txnToThresholdSet[txnHash] of the former transaction. As a result, the approval process for transaction minting will be broken.

Proof of Concept

    bytes32 txnHash = keccak256(payload);
    txnHashToTransaction[txnHash] = Transaction(srcSender, amt);

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L108-L109

        txnToThresholdSet[txnHash] = TxnThreshold(
          t.numberOfApprovalsNeeded,
          new address[](0)
        );

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L137-L140

    (bytes32 version, address srcSender, uint256 amt, uint256 nonce) = abi
      .decode(payload, (bytes32, address, uint256, uint256));

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L90-L91

Tools Used

VSCode

It is recommended to include the srcChain and the srcAddr in the payload as well, which is getting hashed to calculate the txnHash. By doing so, different transactions coming from different srcChains and srcAddr will not result into the same txnHash. The approval process for the transaction minting via the bridge will successfully execute.

kirk-baird (judge) decreased severity to Medium

ali2251 (Ondo) confirmed


[M-04] Admin can’t burn tokens from blocklisted addresses because of a check in _beforeTokenTransfer

Submitted by 0xAsen, also found by Arz, Inspecktor, merlin, Delvir0, BenRai, and 0xStalin

The function burn is made so the admin can burn rUSDY tokens from any account (this is stated in the comments). However, the admin can’t burn tokens if the account from which they’re trying to burn tokens is blocklisted/sanctioned/not on the allow-list.

Proof of Concept

Let’s check the burn function which calls the internal _burnShares function:

function burn(
    address _account,
    uint256 _amount
  ) external onlyRole(BURNER_ROLE) {
    uint256 sharesAmount = getSharesByRUSDY(_amount);

    _burnShares(_account, sharesAmount);

    usdy.transfer(msg.sender, sharesAmount / BPS_DENOMINATOR);

    emit TokensBurnt(_account, _amount);
  }

  function _burnShares(
    address _account,
    uint256 _sharesAmount
  ) internal whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
    require(_account != address(0), "BURN_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");

    _beforeTokenTransfer(_account, address(0), _sharesAmount); <--

    uint256 accountShares = shares[_account];
    require(_sharesAmount <= accountShares, "BURN_AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_BALANCE");

    uint256 preRebaseTokenAmount = getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount);

    totalShares -= _sharesAmount;

    shares[_account] = accountShares - _sharesAmount;

    uint256 postRebaseTokenAmount = getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount);

    return totalShares;

We can see that it calls _beforeTokenTransfer(_account, address(0), _sharesAmount).

Here is the code of _beforeTokenTransfer:

function _beforeTokenTransfer(
    address from,
    address to,
    uint256
  ) internal view {
    // Check constraints when `transferFrom` is called to facilitate
    // a transfer between two parties that are not `from` or `to`.
    if (from != msg.sender && to != msg.sender) {
      require(!_isBlocked(msg.sender), "rUSDY: 'sender' address blocked");
      require(!_isSanctioned(msg.sender), "rUSDY: 'sender' address sanctioned");
      require(
        _isAllowed(msg.sender),
        "rUSDY: 'sender' address not on allowlist"
      );
    }

    if (from != address(0)) { <--
      // If not minting
      require(!_isBlocked(from), "rUSDY: 'from' address blocked");
      require(!_isSanctioned(from), "rUSDY: 'from' address sanctioned");
      require(_isAllowed(from), "rUSDY: 'from' address not on allowlist");
    }

    if (to != address(0)) {
      // If not burning
      require(!_isBlocked(to), "rUSDY: 'to' address blocked");
      require(!_isSanctioned(to), "rUSDY: 'to' address sanctioned");
      require(_isAllowed(to), "rUSDY: 'to' address not on allowlist");
    }
  }

In our case, the form would be the account from which we’re burning tokens, so it’ll enter in the 2nd if: if (from != address(0)). But given that the account is blocked/sanctioned/not on the allow-list, the transaction will revert and the tokens won’t be burned.

Given that there are separate roles for burning and managing the block/sanctions/allowed lists (BURNER_ROLE and LIST_CONFIGURER_ROLE), it is very possible that such a scenario would occur.

In that case, the Burner would have to ask the List Configurer to update the lists, so the Burner can burn the tokens, and then the List Configurer should update the lists again. However, in that case, you’re risking that the blocked user manages to transfer their funds while performing these operations.

Organize the logic of the function better. For example, you can make the 2nd if to be: if (from != address(0) && to != address(0)). That way, we’ll not enter the if when burning tokens, and we’ll be able to burn tokens from blocked accounts.

Assessed type

Invalid Validation

tom2o17 (Ondo) disputed and commented via duplicate issue #120:

Can I not assume that the guardian can batch execute transactions? Given that the guardian will also have the ability to add/remove from blocklist, can I not assume that the guardian can batch:

blocklist.removeFromBlocklist()
rUSDY.burn()
blocklist.addToBlocklist()

IFL this is not an issue considering the guardian address can execute any peripheral txns in an atomic fashion.

kirk-baird (judge) commented via duplicate issue #120:

This is an interesting edge case. While it may be possible for guardian to bypass this issue, if it is a smart contract that can batch transactions, I see this as a potential issue.

Going to downgrade issue #120 to medium severity, as there are some theoretical workarounds to this problem.

tom2o17 (Ondo) commented via duplicate issue #120:

Not to impact judging,

But to your point @kirk-baird, we are using a gnosis safe contract as the guardian, and plan to do a similar setup for the majority of tokens going forward. Perhaps we should have made note of that in the ReadME.md.

kirk-baird (judge) commented via duplicate issue #120:

@tom2o17 - Okay thanks for clarifying - that does resolve the issue. Though, for the judging the wardens weren’t aware of this so I’ll consider it a valid issue.

ali2251 (Ondo) acknowledged


Low Risk and Non-Critical Issues

For this audit, 34 reports were submitted by wardens detailing low risk and non-critical issues. The report highlighted below by adriro received the top score from the judge.

The following wardens also submitted reports: gkrastenov, Arz, castle_chain, 0xmystery, matrix_0wl, Raihan, Breeje, klau5, nirlin, MohammedRizwan, Udsen, dev0cloo, Aymen0909, peanuts, catellatech, Lalanda, SovaSlava, wahedtalash77, kutugu, ladboy233, ohm, 0xpanicError, codegpt, BenRai, ast3ros, sandy, bin2chen, 0x6980, Stormreckson, pipidu83, hals, 0xanmol, and 0xStalin.

Low Issues Summary

ID Issue
[L-01] Confusing semantics for bridged messages approvals
[L-02] No default threshold configuration
[L-03] Validate number of approvers in setThresholds()
[L-04] Missing safe wrapper for ERC20 transfer in rescueTokens()
[L-05] Account may get blacklisted during the bridge process
[L-06] Missing validation for index parameter in overrideRange()
[L-07] Oracle assumes asset has 18 decimals
[L-08] Wrong argument in Transfer event of wrap() function
[L-09] Wrong argument in TransferShares event of wrap() function
[L-10] Contracts can be re-deployed in rUSDY factory

Non-Critical Issues Summary

ID Issue
[N-01] Missing calls to base initializers in rUSDY
[N-02] Missing event to notify oracle has changed in rUSDY

[L-01] Confusing semantics for bridged messages approvals

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L111

Bridged messages get an “automatic” approval while the message is being executed in the destination bridge contract, which means that all messages effectively get one approval as soon as they are bridged.

This implies that “real” approvals would require setting a threshold with a numberOfApprovalsNeeded of at least two.

This brings a lot of unnecessary confusing semantics to the approvals scheme and could potentially lead to errors in configuration settings that would allow messages to go through automatically when actually they are expected to be approved.

It is recommended to remove this automatic approval and treat each approval as an explicit approval action of the set of enabled approvers.

[L-02] No default threshold configuration

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L128

The implementation of _attachThreshold() loops through each of the configured set of thresholds searching for the element that adjusts to the bridged amount.

If no configuration is found the function will revert, the message will be lost and it will require manual handling.

It is recommended setting a default value (a high value number of approvals) to be used when no threshold configuration matches.

[L-03] Validate number of approvers in setThresholds()

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L255

The setThresholds() function should validate that elements in the numOfApprovers array are greater than zero.

[L-04] Missing safe wrapper for ERC20 transfer in rescueTokens()

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L322

Use a “safe” wrapper to execute ERC20 transfer for better compatibility.

[L-05] Account may get blacklisted during the bridge process

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L349

Accounts that bridge tokens may get blacklisted in the source chain after the bridging process had been initiated. This could lead to different issues:

  • If the account is not blacklisted in the destination chain, the user may still operate their funds.
  • If the account is blacklisted, then the function will revert and could be treated as a failure that would require manual intervention.

[L-06] Missing validation for index parameter in overrideRange()

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L186

The overrideRange() function should validate that indexToModify is within bounds, i.e. require(indexToModify < rangeLength).

[L-07] Oracle assumes asset has 18 decimals

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L282

The roundUpTo8() implementation assumes the asset has 18 decimals, as the rounding is done using 1e10 (since 18 - 8 = 10). It is recommended to use a constant to properly state this dependency and for a better understanding.

[L-08] Wrong argument in Transfer event of wrap() function

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L438

The third argument to the Transfer event is expecting the amount of rUSDY tokens but it is wrongly called with getRUSDYByShares(_USDYAmount), which lacks the proper scaling to convert the USDY amount to shares.

The correct version should be:

emit Transfer(address(0), msg.sender, getRUSDYByShares(_USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR));

[L-09] Wrong argument in TransferShares event of wrap() function

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L439

The third argument to the TransferShares event is expecting the amount of shares but it is wrongly called with _USDYAmount, which is the amount of USDY tokens, not the shares.

The correct version should be:

emit TransferShares(address(0), msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR);

[L-10] Contracts can be re-deployed in rUSDY factory

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDYFactory.sol#L75

The rUSDY contract can be redeployed by the guardian by calling deployrUSDY() in the rUSDYFactory contract. This will deploy a new set of contracts and overwrite the storage variables that link to the contract.

It is recommended to add a check to avoid redeployment once contracts have been deployed.

[N-01] Missing calls to base initializers in rUSDY

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L120

The __rUSDY_init() function doesn’t call the initializers for some of the base contracts:

  • Initializable
  • ContextUpgradeable
  • PausableUpgradeable
  • AccessControlEnumerableUpgradeable

[N-02] Missing event to notify oracle has changed in rUSDY

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L662

The setOracle() function should emit an event to signal off-chain actors that the oracle has been updated.

kirk-baird (judge) commented:

The issues raised in this report are all valid and contain quality analysis. They correctly determine the severity except L-01, which I would consider a non-critical severity, rather than low.

ali2251 (Ondo) confirmed


Gas Optimizations

For this audit, 21 reports were submitted by wardens detailing gas optimizations. The report highlighted below by c3phas received the top score from the judge.

The following wardens also submitted reports: adriro, naman1778, K42, kaveyjoe, petrichor, zabihullahazadzoi, MohammedRizwan, SY_S, SAQ, SAAJ, wahedtalash77, 0xhex, 0xta, jeffy, 0x11singh99, albahaca, Eurovickk, ybansal2403, castle_chain, and matrix_0wl.

Auditor’s Disclaimer

While we try our best to maintain readability in the provided code snippets, some functions have been truncated to highlight the affected portions.

It’s important to note that during the implementation of these suggested changes, developers must exercise caution to avoid introducing vulnerabilities. Although the optimizations have been tested prior to these recommendations, it is the responsibility of the developers to conduct thorough testing again.

Code reviews and additional testing are strongly advised to minimize any potential risks associated with the refactoring process.

Codebase impressions

The developers have done an excellent job of identifying and implementing some of the most evident optimizations.

However, we have identified additional areas where optimization is possible, some of which may not be immediately apparent.

Note on Gas estimates

We’ve tried to give the exact amount of gas being saved from running the included tests. Whenever the function is within the test coverage, the average gas before and after will be included, and often a diff of the code will also accompany this.

Some functions are not covered by the test cases or are internal/private functions. In this case, the gas can be estimated by looking at the opcodes involved.

Pack structs by putting data types that can fit together next to each other

As the solidity EVM works with 32 bytes, variables less than 32 bytes should be packed inside a struct so that they can be stored in the same slot. This saves gas when writing to storage ~20000 gas

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/02ebedeeb85b708345a4deb53a2b543ecae160d0/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L295-L300

We can pack start and end together by reducing their size to uint48, since they are just timestamps (save 1 SLOT: 2K Gas)

File: /contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
295:  struct Range {
296:    uint256 start;
297:    uint256 end;
298:    uint256 dailyInterestRate;
299:    uint256 prevRangeClosePrice;
300:  }
diff --git a/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol b/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
index 03aa7d6..6b8ff93 100644
--- a/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
+++ b/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
@@ -293,8 +293,8 @@ contract RWADynamicOracle is IRWAOracle, AccessControlEnumerable, Pausable {
   //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////*/

   struct Range {
-    uint256 start;
-    uint256 end;
+    uint48 start;
+    uint48 end;
     uint256 dailyInterestRate;
     uint256 prevRangeClosePrice;
   }

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/02ebedeeb85b708345a4deb53a2b543ecae160d0/contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol#L61-L74

The function should first verify if msg.value > 0 before performing any other operation (Saves 7146 Gas)

In case of a revert on msg.value == 0 we save 7146 gas on average from the protocol gas tests (to simulate the sad path ie msg.value == 0 see the test modification).

Min Average Median Max
Before 9815 9815 9815 9815
After 2669 2669 2669 2669
File: /contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
61:  function burnAndCallAxelar(
62:    uint256 amount,
63:    string calldata destinationChain
64:  ) external payable whenNotPaused {
65:    // check destinationChain is correct
66:    string memory destContract = destChainToContractAddr[destinationChain];

68:    if (bytes(destContract).length == 0) {
69:      revert DestinationNotSupported();
70:    }

72:    if (msg.value == 0) {
73:      revert GasFeeTooLow();
74:    }
diff --git a/contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol b/contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
index 457bf41..b436ff7 100644
--- a/contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
+++ b/contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ contract SourceBridge is Ownable, Pausable, IMulticall {
     uint256 amount,
     string calldata destinationChain
   ) external payable whenNotPaused {
+
+    if (msg.value == 0) {
+      revert GasFeeTooLow();
+    }
     // check destinationChain is correct
     string memory destContract = destChainToContractAddr[destinationChain];

@@ -69,10 +73,6 @@ contract SourceBridge is Ownable, Pausable, IMulticall {
       revert DestinationNotSupported();
     }

-    if (msg.value == 0) {
-      revert GasFeeTooLow();
-    }

To get the perfect representation of the gas being saved, I modified the test function test_bridge() as follows:

   function test_bridge() public initializeAlice {
     uint256 gasReceiverBalanceBefore = AXELAR_GAS_SERVICE.balance;

     // Expect event emit from gas receiver
     bytes memory payload = abi.encode(bytes32("1.0"), alice, 100e18, 0);
     bytes32 payloadHash = keccak256(payload);
-    vm.expectEmit(true, true, true, true);
+    //vm.expectEmit(true, true, true, true);
     emit NativeGasPaidForContractCall(
       address(usdyBridge),
       "optimism",
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ contract Test_SourceBridge is USDY_BasicDeployment, SourceBridgeEvents {
     );

     // Expect event emit from gateway
-    vm.expectEmit(true, true, true, true);
+    //vm.expectEmit(true, true, true, true);
     emit ContractCall(
       address(usdyBridge),
       "optimism",
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ contract Test_SourceBridge is USDY_BasicDeployment, SourceBridgeEvents {

     // Bridge Tokens
     vm.prank(alice);
-    usdyBridge.burnAndCallAxelar{value: 0.01 ether}(100e18, "optimism");
+    usdyBridge.burnAndCallAxelar{value: 0.00 ether}(100e18, "optimism");

     assertEq(usdy.balanceOf(address(usdyBridge)), 0);
     assertEq(usdy.balanceOf(alice), 0);

Note, using the vm.expectRevert also produces the same benchmarks.

Optimize the function _mintIfThresholdMet()

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L337-L353

Only read state if we are going to execute the entire logic (Saves ~2000 gas for the state read)

File: /contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
337:  function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
338:    bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash);
339:    Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
340:    if (thresholdMet) {
341:      _checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount);
342:      if (!ALLOWLIST.isAllowed(txn.sender)) {
343:        ALLOWLIST.setAccountStatus(
344:          txn.sender,
345:          ALLOWLIST.getValidTermIndexes()[0],
346:          true
347:        );
348:      }
349:      TOKEN.mint(txn.sender, txn.amount);
350:      delete txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
351:      emit BridgeCompleted(txn.sender, txn.amount);
352:    }
353:  }

The function above, only mints if the threshold is met. Before checking the status of whether the threshold is met or not, we making a state read(Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];), which is quite expensive. We then proceed to check if the threshold is met and execute the function if the threshold is indeed met. If not met, we would not execute anything, but we would still have made the state read, as it’s being read before the check.

We can refactor the function to have the check before to avoid wasting gas in case threshold is not met:

diff --git a/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol b/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
index 8ad410c..13cc444 100644
--- a/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
+++ b/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
@@ -336,8 +336,8 @@ contract DestinationBridge is
    */
   function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
     bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash);
-    Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
     if (thresholdMet) {
+      Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
       _checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount);
       if (!ALLOWLIST.isAllowed(txn.sender)) {
         ALLOWLIST.setAccountStatus(

Optimize check order: avoid making any state reads/writes if we have to validate some function parameters

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L30-L46

File: /contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
30:  constructor(
31:    address admin,
32:    address setter,
33:    address pauser,
34:    uint256 firstRangeStart,
35:    uint256 firstRangeEnd,
36:    uint256 dailyIR,
37:    uint256 startPrice
38:  ) {
39:    _grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin);
40:    _grantRole(PAUSER_ROLE, pauser);
41:    _grantRole(SETTER_ROLE, setter);

43:    if (firstRangeStart >= firstRangeEnd) revert InvalidRange();
44:    uint256 trueStart = (startPrice * ONE) / dailyIR;
45:    ranges.push(Range(firstRangeStart, firstRangeEnd, dailyIR, trueStart));
46:  }

We have a check for function parameters which reverts the whole transaction if firstRangeStart >= firstRangeEnd. In case of a revert, all the gas consumed so far will not be refunded. If we look at our constructor, the operations that happen before this check consume so much gas, as they involve reading and writing states. The _grantRole() is inherited and the function has the following implementation:

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/external/openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol#L238-L243

File: /contracts/external/openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol
238:  function _grantRole(bytes32 role, address account) internal virtual {
239:    if (!hasRole(role, account)) {
240:      _roles[role].members[account] = true;
241:      emit RoleGranted(role, account, _msgSender());
242:    }
243:  }

Now the above function is called 3 times in our constructor. Most of these reads/writes will be cold, thus the cost would be higher.

diff --git a/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol b/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
index 03aa7d6..fd07948 100644
--- a/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
+++ b/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
@@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ contract RWADynamicOracle is IRWAOracle, AccessControlEnumerable, Pausable {
     uint256 dailyIR,
     uint256 startPrice
   ) {
+        if (firstRangeStart >= firstRangeEnd) revert InvalidRange();
     _grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin);
     _grantRole(PAUSER_ROLE, pauser);
     _grantRole(SETTER_ROLE, setter);

-    if (firstRangeStart >= firstRangeEnd) revert InvalidRange();
     uint256 trueStart = (startPrice * ONE) / dailyIR;
     ranges.push(Range(firstRangeStart, firstRangeEnd, dailyIR, trueStart));
   }

Don’t cache calls that are only used once

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/02ebedeeb85b708345a4deb53a2b543ecae160d0/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L322-L325

DestinationBridge.sol.rescueTokens(): Saves 8 gas

Min Average Median Max
Before 2608 16302 16302 29996
After 2608 16294 16294 29980
File: /contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
322:  function rescueTokens(address _token) external onlyOwner {
323:    uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
324:    IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(), balance);
325:  }
diff --git a/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol b/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
index 8ad410c..376f1c3 100644
--- a/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
+++ b/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
@@ -320,8 +320,7 @@ contract DestinationBridge is
    * @param _token The address of the token to rescue
    */
   function rescueTokens(address _token) external onlyOwner {
-    uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
-    IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(), balance);
+    IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(), IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this)));
   }

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/02ebedeeb85b708345a4deb53a2b543ecae160d0/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L337-L353

DestinationBridge.sol.\_mintIfThresholdMet(): Saves 10 gas

Benchmarks are based on the function approve(), which calls our internal function.

Min Average Median Max
Before 1801 62199 27240 159159
After 1801 62189 27224 159146
File: /contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
337:  function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
338:    bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash);
339:    Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
340:    if (thresholdMet) {
341:      _checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount);
diff --git a/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol b/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
index 8ad410c..4562f20 100644
--- a/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
+++ b/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
@@ -335,9 +335,8 @@ contract DestinationBridge is
    * @param txnHash The hash of the transaction we wish to mint
    */
   function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
-    bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash);
     Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
-    if (thresholdMet) {
+    if (_checkThresholdMet(txnHash)) {
       _checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount);
       if (!ALLOWLIST.isAllowed(txn.sender)) {
         ALLOWLIST.setAccountStatus(

Refactor the assembly code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/02ebedeeb85b708345a4deb53a2b543ecae160d0/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L369-L374

Min Average Median Max
Before 4021 7231 7834 17031
After 4017 7217 7822 17015

The div opcode uses 5 gas while the shr opcode uses 3 gas. Since the denominator is known(2), we can simply shift right by 1 which is equivalent to division by 2.

File: /contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
369:        let half := div(base, 2) // for rounding.
370:        for {
371:          n := div(n, 2)
372:        } n {
373:          n := div(n, 2)
374:        } {
diff --git a/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol b/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
index 03aa7d6..fa175e0 100644
--- a/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
+++ b/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
@@ -366,11 +366,11 @@ contract RWADynamicOracle is IRWAOracle, AccessControlEnumerable, Pausable {
         default {
           z := x
         }
-        let half := div(base, 2) // for rounding.
+        let half := shr(1, base) // for rounding.
         for {
-          n := div(n, 2)
+          n := shr(1, n)
         } n {
-          n := div(n, 2)
+          n := shr(1, n)
         } {

Conclusion

It is important to emphasize that the provided recommendations aim to enhance the efficiency of the code without compromising its readability. We understand the value of maintainable and easily understandable code to both developers and auditors.

As you proceed with implementing the suggested optimizations, please exercise caution and be diligent in conducting thorough testing. It is crucial to ensure that the changes are not introducing any new vulnerabilities and that the desired performance improvements are achieved. Review code changes, and perform thorough testing to validate the effectiveness and security of the refactored code.

Should you have any questions or need further assistance, please don’t hesitate to reach out.

tom2o17 (Ondo) confirmed


Audit Analysis

For this audit, 20 analysis reports were submitted by wardens. An analysis report examines the codebase as a whole, providing observations and advice on such topics as architecture, mechanism, or approach. The report highlighted below by catellatech received the top score from the judge.

The following wardens also submitted reports: hunter_w3b, JayShreeRAM, kaveyjoe, DedOhWale, 0xStalin, nirlin, peanuts, m4ttm, Breeje, 0xmystery, mahdikarimi, Bube, K42, sandy, 0xAsen, Krace, castle_chain, hals, and 0xE1D.

Description overview of Ondo Finance

Ondo Finance is a blockchain platform that offers investment opportunities with cryptocurrencies backed by U.S. dollar bank deposits (USDY). USDY earns interest over time, increasing its value. Ondo Finance introduces rUSDY, a variant of USDY that automatically adjusts in quantity to reflect interest but maintains a nominal value of 1 dollar per token. Oracles track the value of USDY. Ondo Finance enables asset transfers between blockchains through bridge contracts.

https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/135237830/274039071-aedb1f32-3277-45e5-89a9-9e47ef0e5add.png

System Overview

Scope

  • SourceBridge.sol - This contract facilitates the transfer of tokens between different blockchains using the Axelar protocol, ensuring that tokens burned on one chain are minted on the corresponding destination chain, provided certain conditions are met, and the necessary gas is paid. Additionally, it provides administrative functionalities and a pause mechanism when needed.
  • DestinationBridge.sol - This contract functions as the destination chain bridge for USDY tokens. Its primary purpose is to facilitate the seamless transfer of USDY tokens from a source blockchain to the destination blockchain where this contract resides. This bridge contract plays a pivotal role in enabling cross-chain interoperability and ensuring that USDY tokens can be securely and efficiently moved between different blockchain networks.
  • rUSDY.sol - This contract serves as the backbone for an interest-bearing token where users can wrap and unwrap their USDY tokens to earn interest. It also includes features for access control and address management.
  • rUSDYFactory.sol - This is a factory contract that allows the deployment of upgradable instances of the rUSDY token contract. It is managed by a guardian address, and the deployment process involves creating an implementation contract, a proxy admin contract, and a proxy contract for the token. The code is designed to facilitate the upgradeability of the rUSDY token and includes functions for batched external calls.
  • RWADynamicOracle.sol - This contract is a dynamic Oracle that provides the price of USDY based on configured time ranges and daily interest rates. It also includes mechanisms for pausing and access control to manage the ranges and contract operation.
  • IRWADynamicOracle - This is an interface that sets a standard for any contract wishing to provide information about the price of RWA (Asset-Backed Real World Assets) or similar assets. Contracts that implement this interface must provide a getPrice() function that returns the current price of RWA. The interface does not contain implementation logic but simply establishes a common structure for communication with dynamic asset price oracles.

Privileged Roles

The SourceBridge contract uses the onlyOwner modifier to restrict access to important administrative functions such as configuring destination chain-to-contract, pausing / unpausing the contract, and executing batch calls to other contracts.

onlyOwner is also present in these functions of the contract DestinationBridge: addApprover, removeApprover, addChainSupport, setThresholds, setMintLimit, setMintLimitDuration, pause, unpause, and rescueTokens.

Only the address that deploys the contract and possesses the owner role can execute these functions. The owner has full control over the contract and its administrative functions.

In the rUSDY contract, we found some roles, such as:

   /// @dev Role based access control roles
  bytes32 public constant USDY_MANAGER_ROLE = keccak256("ADMIN_ROLE");
  bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
  bytes32 public constant PAUSER_ROLE = keccak256("PAUSER_ROLE");
  bytes32 public constant BURNER_ROLE = keccak256("BURN_ROLE");
  bytes32 public constant LIST_CONFIGURER_ROLE =
    keccak256("LIST_CONFIGURER_ROLE");
  • USDY_MANAGER_ROLE: This role has access to functions related to the management of the USDY token, such as changing the oracle that updates the USDY price.
  • MINTER_ROLE: This role has the ability to create new rUSDY tokens by minting them. It is responsible for the wrap function, which allows users to convert USDY into rUSDY.
  • PAUSER_ROLE: This role can pause and unpause the operations of the rUSDY contract. When the contract is paused, transfers and other operations are not available.
  • BURNER_ROLE: This role allows administrators to burn (delete) rUSDY from a specific account using the burn function.
  • LIST_CONFIGURER_ROLE: This role is used to configure the blocklist, allowlist, and sanctions list. Administrators with this role can change the addresses in these lists.

The rUSDYFactory contract defines the following privilege roles:

  • DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: This role represents the default administrator role. It has access to certain administrative functions in the contract.
bytes32 public constant DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = bytes32(0);
  • onlyGuardian: This modifier ensures that only the guardian address has access to certain functions of the contract, such as deployrUSDY.
  modifier onlyGuardian() {
    require(msg.sender == guardian, "rUSDYFactory: You are not the Guardian");
    _;
  }

The RWADynamicOracle contract defines the following roles of privileges:

  bytes32 public constant SETTER_ROLE = keccak256("SETTER_ROLE");
  bytes32 public constant PAUSER_ROLE = keccak256("PAUSER_ROLE");
  • SETTER_ROLE: This role allows certain addresses to set a price range for USDY.
  • PAUSER_ROLE: This role allows certain addresses to pause and unpause the operation of the oracle.

We asked the sponsors about who will be responsible for these roles, and this was their response:

ali2251 — 09/5/2023 at 10:22
it will be managed by multisigs controlled by the protocol

Given the level of control that these roles possess within the system, users must place full trust in the fact that the entities overseeing these roles will always act correctly and in the best interest of the system and its users.

Codebase analysis through diagrams

We have decided to create diagrams detailing each part of the functions of the smart contract provided by the Ondo Finance protocol and to create a summary of the functionality of each of the contracts. This approach proves to be effective for us as it allows us to thoroughly understand all the functionalities of each contract and visually document what we have comprehended through diagrams. Furthermore, we believe that this approach can be useful in enhancing the understanding of the contracts among developers, auditors, and users.

In this audit, the protocol provided 5 contracts and 1 Interface. Here’s a detailed diagrams of the essential components of each one:

Contracts:

SourceBridge:

https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/135237830/274045722-133bc986-e5ca-41dd-b3d7-fdbf8d5489f8.png

DestinationBridge:

https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/135237830/274045929-0420c578-aa31-4274-9af4-ed713505ba82.png

rUSDY:

https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/135237830/274046116-eec1e4c6-cfc2-4842-ad6d-dee34450b262.png

rUSDYFactory:

https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/135237830/274046227-c5cb557f-834a-4057-95ae-1355028f8d0f.png

RWADynamicOracle:

https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/135237830/274046356-08730f29-285f-43e7-b80e-18eb3ca1b285.png

Architecture Feedback

The architecture of the Ondo Finance project seems solid in general, but there is always room for improvements and adjustments. Here are some areas that could be improved:

  • Upgradeability: Since the contracts rUSDY and rUSDYFactory are upgradeable, having a clear and secure process for performing upgrades is important. It may also be useful to implement time limits for upgrades or allow a majority of users to approve upgrades.
  • Governance: Consider incorporating a governance system to allow users to vote on key decisions, such as changes in interest rates or adjustments to system parameters.
  • Oracles and Data Consistency: The consistency and accuracy of oracle data are crucial. You can explore the possibility of using multiple oracles or implementing consensus mechanisms to ensure data reliability.
  • Testing and Simulations: Even though the project implements several tests, upon reviewing the codebase, there are several crucial functions that don’t, such as rUSDY:transferFrom. Conduct thorough testing of all contracts and functions and simulations to understand how they will behave under various market conditions. This can help anticipate potential issues.

Documents

The documentation of the Ondo Finance project is quite comprehensive and detailed, providing a solid overview of how Ondo is structured and how its various aspects function. However, we have noticed that there is room for additional details, such as diagrams, to gain a deeper understanding of how different contracts interact and the functions they implement. With considerable enthusiasm, we have dedicated some days to creating diagrams for each of the contracts.

We are confident that these diagrams will bring significant value to the protocol, as they can be seamlessly integrated into the existing documentation, enriching it and providing a more comprehensive and detailed understanding for users, developers and auditors.

Systemic & Centralization Risks

Here’s an analysis of potential systemic and centralization risks in the provided contracts:

  • Loss of Funds Risk: If the contract stores or manages digital assets (such as tokens), there is an inherent risk of funds being lost due to errors in the contract’s logic or malicious attacks.
  • The protocol uses a proxy, and according to the Documentation, the type of proxy is:

    * 3) TransparentUpgradeableProxy - OZ, proxy contract. Admin is set to `address(proxyAdmin)`.
    *                                          `_logic' is set to `address(rUSDY)`.

    If the logic controlling the proxy is not implemented correctly, there could be vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to modify the underlying contract, or the proxy itself, in an unintended way.

  • Price Manipulation Risk: Since these contracts are designed to calculate the price of USDY based on interest rates and price ranges, there is a risk that parameters may be manipulated or that input data may be compromised, potentially leading to incorrect prices.
  • Centralized Administration Risk: If the contract has administrator roles that can modify settings or pause the contract, there is a risk that these capabilities may be used improperly or become targets for attacks.
  • Third-Party Dependency Risk: Contracts rely on external data sources, such as @openzeppelin/contracts, and there is a risk that if any issues are found with these dependencies in your contracts, the Ondo finance protocol could also be affected.

    • We observed that old versions of OpenZeppelin are used in the project, and these should be updated to the latest version:
    29: "@openzeppelin/contracts": "^4.8.3",
    30: "@openzeppelin/hardhat-upgrades": "1.22.1",

    The latest version is 4.9.3 (as of July 28, 2023), while the project uses version 4.8.3.

That’s why we strongly recommend that once the issues in the codebase identified by C4 Wardens are known, the Ondo Finance team takes action to implement the mitigations and make their protocol a robust financial ecosystem for all participants.

Monitoring Recommendations

While audits help in identifying code-level issues in the current implementation and potentially the code deployed in production, the Ondo Finance team is encouraged to consider incorporating monitoring activities in the production environment. Ongoing monitoring of deployed contracts helps identify potential threats and issues affecting production environments. With the goal of providing a complete security assessment, the monitoring recommendations section raises several actions addressing trust assumptions and out-of-scope components that can benefit from on-chain monitoring.

Financial Activity

Consider monitoring the token transfers over the bridge to identify:

  • Transfers during normal operations to establish a baseline of healthy properties. Any large deviation, such as an unexpectedly large withdrawal, may indicate unusual behavior of the contracts or an ongoing attack.
  • Transactions that revert.

These may indicate a user interface bug, an ongoing attack or other unexpected edge cases.

Time Spent

A total of 3 days (15 hours) were dedicated to completing this audit, distributed as follows:

  1. 1st Day: Devoted to comprehending the protocol’s functionalities and implementation.
  2. 2nd Day: Initiated the analysis process, leveraging the documentation offered by Ondo Finance.
  3. 3rd Day: Focused on conducting a thorough analysis, incorporating meticulously crafted diagrams derived from the contracts and information provided by the protocol.

tom2o17 (Ondo) acknowledged


Disclosures

C4 is an open organization governed by participants in the community.

C4 Audits incentivize the discovery of exploits, vulnerabilities, and bugs in smart contracts. Security researchers are rewarded at an increasing rate for finding higher-risk issues. Audit submissions are judged by a knowledgeable security researcher and solidity developer and disclosed to sponsoring developers. C4 does not conduct formal verification regarding the provided code but instead provides final verification.

C4 does not provide any guarantee or warranty regarding the security of this project. All smart contract software should be used at the sole risk and responsibility of users.